


JPRS Report



East Europe

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CONTENTS

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BULGARIA

Results of Mayoral Elections Published [DEMOKRATSIYA 4 Nov]	1
Foreign Economic Relations Ministers on Trade [DUMA 15 Oct]	9

HUNGARY

MDF Spokesman Proposes New Retribution Plan [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 12 Oct]	11
SZDSZ's Political Isolation Discussed [BESZELO 5 Oct]	12

POLAND

Election Results May Slow Pace of Reforms [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 29 Oct]	15
Construction Initiative With USSR [RZECZPOSPOLITA 14 Oct]	15
Large Cocaine Cargo Confiscated in Gdynia [PRAWO I ZYCIE 12 Oct]	16
Call To Combat Narcotics Traffic With Ordinances [PRAWO I ZYCIE 12 Oct]	17

YUGOSLAVIA

Rupel Comments on Country's Declaration [NEODVISNI DNEVNIK 9 Nov]	19
Belgrade Professor on Serbian Ethnic Borders [INTERVJU 11 Oct]	19
Peterle's Party Leads in Election Polls [DELO 2 Nov]	22
Increased Problems With Lawlessness in Croatia [DANAS 22 Oct]	23
Croatian Policy, Constitution Criticized [DANAS 22 Oct]	25
Slovene Intelligence Eavesdropped on JA [DELO 29 Oct]	29
Ineffectiveness of JNA Generals Discussed [DANAS 22 Oct]	33

Results of Mayoral Elections Published

92P20049A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
4 Nov 91 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Union of Democratic Forces Wins Elections for Mayor in Almost All Large Towns in Bulgaria"—first paragraph is DEMOKRATSIYA introduction]

[Text] Six million Bulgarian citizens will be governed by SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] mayors, 2 million by BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] mayors.

By publishing the names of the mayors of the townships throughout the country, we offer our readers the opportunity to get a detailed picture of who the new representatives are in their own and neighboring townships. Moreover, it is readily apparent that the SDS definitely is in first place as a political force. Although the mayors are not deputies who are convened for voting, they are the chief executives in their townships over a specific part of the population.

A sensible person could hardly compare, let alone equate, the mayor of the capital city, with a population of over 1 million, with that of a town of 2 or 3 thousand inhabitants.

And here is a summary of the results: Ninety-four mayors of townships with a combined population of 6,020,000 belong to the SDS, and 120 mayors of townships with a combined population of 2,077,000 belong to the BSP. The difference is almost five to three.

In Bulgaria, there are 38 townships with populations over 50,000. In 31 of them, the mayors belong to the SDS, in six the mayors belong to the BSP, and in one the mayor is a member of the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms]. There are comparatively few significant centers in which the BSP received a majority. The BSP mayors were elected mainly in townships with populations under 20,000. This also defines the BSP's secondary importance as a political force.

The proportion is more disparate among village mayors, who are actually subordinate to township mayors and administrations. Here the BSP has a marked preponderance—over 1,800 local mayors as opposed to the SDS's 480. The influence of village mayors will not be without significance in the resolution of difficult issues concerning the restitution of land. No matter how limited their power is, their opposition to this process should not be underestimated. However, their election reflects the will of the people and is a fact of life.

Quite a few conclusions can be drawn from the data on the election of township mayors in various regions of the country, and we hope that sociologists will not miss this opportunity to restore their shaky authority after their unfortunate prognoses for the parliamentary elections.

We are publishing the names of the mayors of townships by electoral districts. The population figures are from the 1990 statistical annual. For some of the new townships, data are unavailable. [Translator's note: The following abbreviations are used, in addition to those previously mentioned: BZNS-e for Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United; BZNS-NP for Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-Nikola Petkov; and SDS-ts for Union of Democratic Forces-Center]

Blagoevgrad Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Blagoevgrad	83,000	Eliana Maseva	SDS
2	Bansko	15,000	Petur Baryakov	SDS
3	Belitsa	12,000	Georgi Belyov	SDS
4	Gotse Delchev	34,000	Khenrikh Mikhaylov	SDS
5	Gurmen	14,000	Bastri Misirkov	DPS
6	Kresna	7,000	Deyana Stancheva	SDS
7	Marikostenovo	—	Andon Smilyanov	BZNS-e
8	Petrich	57,000	Petur Iliev	SDS
9	Razlog	23,000	Kostadin Rachev	SDS
10	Sandanski	46,000	Radko Penzov	SDS
11	Satovcha	17,000	Yusuf Dzhudzhu	BSP
12	Simitli	16,000	Dimitur Padeshki	SDS
13	Strumyani	8,000	Botyo Penev	SDS
14	Khadzhidimovo	12,000	Petur Videnov	BSP
15	Yakoruda	11,000	Naila Vurgova	DPS

Totals: 10 townships with 301,000 for the SDS; 2 townships with 29,000 for the BSP; 2 townships with 25,000 for the DPS; 1 township (population not given) for the BZNS-e.

Burgas Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Burgas	223,000	Prodan Prodanov	SDS
2	Aytos	35,000	N. Davidov	BSP
3	Grudovo	19,000	B. Kamenov	BSP
4	Kameno	13,000	Stefan Bonev	BSP
5	Karnobat	33,000	Chonko Zapryanov	BSP
6	Malko Turnovo	6,000	Zhelyazko Matev	BSP
7	Nesebur	15,000	Strakhil Lambov	SDS
8	Pomorie	27,000	Mikhail Shterev	Independent
9	Ruen	33,000	Huseyin Ismail	DPS
10	Sozopol	17,000	Dragomir Ivanov	SDS
11	Sungurlare	17,000	Ivan Uzunov	BSP
12	Tsarevo	10,000	Dimitur Matrakchiev	Independent

Totals: 3 townships with 255,000 for the SDS; 6 townships with 123,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 33,000 for the DPS; 2 townships with 37,000 for independent candidates.

Varna Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Varna	314,000	Eng. Khristo Kirchev	SDS
2	Aksakovo	17,000	Khristo Toshkov	BSP
3	Beloslav	13,000	Aleksandur Kurtev	SDS
4	Byala	4,000	Iliyan Tsonev	SDS
5	Vetrino	10,000	Georgi Stoyanov	BSP
6	Vulchi Dol	16,000	Vasil Vasilev	BSP
7	Devnya	11,000	Zdravko Angelov	SDS
8	Dolen Chiflik	21,000	Stoyan Stoyanov	BSP
9	Dulgopol	17,000	Krustinka Genova	SDS
10	Provadiya	28,000	Ivo Seferov	BSP
11	Suvorovo	8,000	Atanas Atansaov	BSP

Totals: 5 townships with 359,000 for the SDS; 6 townships with 100,000 for the BSP.

Veliko Turnovo Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Veliko Turnovo	100,000	Boris Krumov	SDS
2	Gorna Oryakhovitsa	63,000	Nikola Kolev	BSP
3	Elena	14,000	Sasho Topalov	BSP
4	Zlataritsa	6,000	Milko Dzhevderov	BSP
5	Lyaskovets	19,000	Khristofor Kalendzhiev	SDS
6	Pavlikeni	35,000	Ventseslav Ivanov	BSP
7	Polski Trumbesh	24,000	Plamen Minev	BSP
8	Svishtov	51,000	Krasimir Krustev	SDS
9	Strazhitsa	18,000	Trifon Trifonov	BSP
10	Sukhindol	4,000	Yordan Yordanov	BSP

Totals: 3 townships with 170,000 for the SDS; 7 townships with 164,000 for the BSP.

Vidin Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Vidin	90,000	Mladen Kamenov	SDS
2	Belogradchik	10,000	Boris Nikolov	BSP
3	Boynitsa	4,000	Bogdan Stanev	BSP
4	Bregovo	10,000	Aleksandur Firkov	BSP
5	Gramada	4,000	Tsvetan Kostov	BSP
6	Dimovo	11,000	Todor Todorov	BSP
7	Kula	9,000	Dragomir Dankov	BSP
8	Makresh	4,000	Mito Nikolov	BSP
9	Novo Selo	5,000	Radoslav Todorov	SDS
10	Ruzhintsi	7,000	Emil Velkov	BSP
11	Chuprene	4,000	Georgi Stefanov	BSP

Totals: 2 townships with 95,000 for the SDS; 9 townships with 63,000 for the BSP.

Vratsa Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Vratsa	102,000	Chavdar Savov	SDS
2	Borovan	8,000	Petur Tsvetkovski	BSP
3	Byala Slatina	37,000	Atanas Draganov	SDS
4	Kozloduy	23,000	Milko Barbov	BSP
5	Knezha	19,000	Veselin Popinski	BSP
6	Krivodol	14,000	Krum Sotirov	BSP
7	Mezdra	31,000	Tsvetko Petkov	BSP
8	Miziya	13,000	Ivanka Krumcheva	BSP
9	Oryakhovo	18,000	Krasimir Vasilev	BSP
10	Roman	11,000	Nikolay Minovski	BSP
11	Khayredin	8,000	Petur Popov	BSP

Totals: 2 townships with 139,000 for the SDS; 9 townships with 145,000 for the BSP.

Gabrovo Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Gabrovo	88,000	Ivan Nenov	SDS
2	Dryanovo	15,000	Nikola Filev	BSP
3	Sevlievo	50,000	Dancho Danchev	SDS
4	Tryavna	17,000	Lyudmil Ivanov	SDS

Totals: 3 townships with 155,000 for the SDS; 1 township with 15,000 for the BSP.

Dobrich Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Dobrich	113,000	Yosif Marinov	SDS
2	Balchik	24,000	Stanko Stankov	SDS
3	General Toshevo	25,000	Dimitur Mikhaylov	BSP
4	Kavarna	19,000	Amira Mitkov	BSP
5	Krushari	8,000	Dobri Stoyanov	BZNS-e
6	Tervel	29,000	Georgi Gospodinov	Independent
7	Shabla	8,000	Kosta Kostov	BSP

Totals: 2 townships with 137,000 for the SDS; 3 townships with 52,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 8,000 for the BZNS-e; 1 township with 29,000 for an independent candidate.

Kurdzhali Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Kurdzhali	111,000	Ivo Saraliyski	DPS (pending)
2	Ardino	27,000	Neadzi Khodzhev	DPS
3	Dzhebel	24,000	Ali Osman Esar	DPS
4	Kirkovo	42,000	Mustafa H. Emin	DPS
5	Krumovgrad	45,000	Mustafa I. Umed	DPS
6	Momchilgrad	33,000	Sabaktin R. Ali	DPS
7	Chernoochene	15,000	Nino M. Rodopski	DPS

Total: 7 townships with 297,000 for the DPS.

Kyustendil Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Kyustendil	81,000	Ivan Gyugrinchev	SDS
2	Bobov Dol	14,000	Yordanka Kalenichkova	BSP
3	Boboshevo	5,000	Asen Volev	BSP
4	Dupnitsa	58,000	Pencho Panayotov	SDS
5	Kocherinovo	7,000	Petur B. Spasov	BSP
6	Nevestino	6,000	Raycho Paunov	BSP
7	Rila	4,000	Ivan P. Ramichkov	BSP
8	Sapareva Banya	2,000	Tsvetan N. Dinev	SDS
9	Treklyano	2,000	Kamen Arsov	BSP

Totals: 3 townships with 141,000 for the SDS; 6 townships with 38,000 for the BSP.

Lovech Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Lovech	72,000	Mincho Dikov	SDS
2	Apriltsi	5,000	Stoyan Angelov	BZNS-e
3	Letnitsa	7,000	Yordan Tsonchev	SDS
4	Lukovit	24,000	Dr. Stefan Vasilev	BZNS-e
5	Teteven	27,000	Tsanko Tsankov	SDS
6	Troyan	44,000	Konstantin Fichev	SDS
7	Ugurchin	11,000	Milena Monova	SDS
8	Yablanitsa	8,000	Rumen Petrov	SDS-ts

Totals: 5 townships with 161,000 for the SDS; 2 townships with 29,000 for the BZNS-e; 1 township with 8,000 for the SDS-ts.

Mikhaylovgrad Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Mikhaylovgrad	71,000	Lyudmil Sandov	SDS
2	Berkovitsa	27,000	Yordan Velkov	BSP
3	Boychinovtsi	14,000	Stoil Stoilov	BSP
4	Brusartsi	8,000	Tsvetan Grigorov	BSP
5	Vulchedrum	16,000	Ivan Gospodinov	BSP
6	Vurshets	11,000	Georgi Boyadzhiev	BZNS-e
7	Georgi Damyanovo	6,000	Emil Purvanov	BSP
8	Lom	44,000	Yordan Kirilov	SDS

Mikhaylovgrad Electoral District (Continued)

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
9	Medkovets	7,000	Ventseslav Kukudenski	BSP
10	Yakimovo	7,000	Boyka Petrova	BSP
11	Chiprovtsi	—	Angel Dimitrov	SDS

Totals: 3 townships with 115,000 (minus Chiprovtsi) for the SDS; 7 townships with 71,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 11,000 for the BZNS-e.

Pazardzhik Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Pazardzhik	135,000	Georgi Terzov	SDS
2	Batak	9,000	Vasil Nenov	BZNS-e
3	Belovo	13,000	Valeri Spasov	SDS
4	Bratsigovo	13,000	Iliya Kalinov	BSP
5	Velingrad	43,000	Vladimir Stoenchev	SDS
6	Lesichevo	7,000	Georgi Stoilov	BSP
7	Panagyurishte	35,000	Yasen Khristov	SDS
8	Peshtera	23,000	Dimitur Takov	SDS
9	Septemvri	33,000	Yordan Ilinchev	SDS
10	Strelcha	7,000	Nesho Markov	BSP
11	Rakitovo	15,000	Veneta Zakharieva	SDS

Totals: 7 townships with 297,000 for the SDS; 3 townships with 27,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 9,000 for the BZNS-e.

Pernik Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Pernik	120,000	Dimitur Boyadzhiev	SDS
2	Breznik	11,000	Georgi Al. Mikhaylov	BSP
3	Zemen	5,000	Emanuil Kostadinov	SDS
4	Radomir	29,000	Dr. Georgi Dimitrov	SDS
5	Trun	7,000	Nikolay Georgiev	BSP

Totals: 3 townships with 154,000 for the SDS; 2 townships with 18,000 for the BSP.

Pleven Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Pleven	168,000	Dr. Aleksandrov Aleksandrov	SDS
2	Belene	14,000	Petur Dulev	BSP
3	Gulyantsi	20,000	Iliycho Ganchev	BSP
4	Dolna Mitropoliya	30,000	Radoslav Georgiev	BSP
5	Dolni Dubnik	17,000	Ventseslav Vurbanov	SDS
6	Levski	30,000	Khristofor Petrov	SDS
7	Nikopol	16,000	Ivan Dronchev	BSP
8	Pelovo	10,000	Naum Naumov	BSP
9	Pordim	10,000	Dora Vetkova	BSP
10	Cherven Bryag	43,000	Toshko Todorov	BSP

Totals: 3 townships with 215,000 for the SDS; 7 townships with 143,000 for the BSP.

Plovdiv City and Regional Electoral Districts

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Plovdiv City	369,000	Dr. Garabed Tomasyan	SDS
2	Asenovgrad	75,000	Simeon Todorinov	SDS
3	Brezovo	10,000	Gencho Minchev	BSP
4	Kaloyanovo	15,000	Atanas Terziyski	BSP
5	Karlovo	81,000	Khristo Voynyagovski	SDS
6	Luki	6,000	Krasimir Manov	BSP
7	Maritsa	32,000	Petur Milkov	BZNS-NP
8	Purvomay	36,000	Petur Ganev	SDS
9	Rakovski	30,000	Petur Karparov	SDS
10	Rodopi	80,000	Georgi Lyubenov	SDS
11	Sadovo	17,000	Argir Genchev	BSP
12	Suedinenie	13,000	Angel Kusov	BZNS-NP
13	Khisarya	18,000	Makaveya Demkov	SDS

Totals: 7 townships with 689,000 for the SDS; 4 townships with 48,000 for the BSP; 2 townships with 45,000 for the BZNS-NP.

Razgrad Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Razgrad	76,000	Veselin Uzunov	BSP
2	Zavet	16,000	Mustafa Kurtev	DPS
3	Isperikh	34,000	Recep Feim	DPS
4	Kubrat	31,000	Petsi Petsev	SDS
5	Loznitsa	19,000	Vehbi Osmanli	DPS
6	Samuil	12,000	Gulner Tahir	DPS
7	Khlebarovo	11,000	Necet S. Cinali	DPS

Totals: 1 township with 31,000 for the SDS; 1 township with 76,000 for the BSP; 5 townships with 95,000 for the DPS.

Ruse Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Ruse	209,000	Asen Tasev	SDS
2	Byala	20,000	Mladen Kozhukharov	SDS
3	Borovo	9,000	Racho Rachev	BSP
4	Vetovo	22,000	Petko Akhnikov	SDS
5	Dve Mogili	15,000	Khristo Petrov	BSP
6	Ivanovo	14,000	Ivan Dimitrov	BSP (pending)
7	Novo Selo	—	Ivan Chernachev	BSP
8	Slivo Pole	17,000	Simeon Krustev	BZNS-NP
9	Tsenovo	10,000	Vladimir Kalinov	BZNS-e

Totals: 3 townships with 251,000 for the SDS; 4 townships with 38,000 (minus Novo Selo) for the BSP; 2 townships with 10,000 (minus Shtruklevo [as published]) for the BZNS-e; 1 township with 17,000 for the BZNS-NP.

Silistra Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Silistra	79,000	Stoyan Plugarov	SDS
2	Alfatar	5,000	Radka Zheleva	BSP
3	Glavinitsa	16,000	Hasan Hasan	DPS
4	Dulovo	36,000	Erdin Rusit	DPS
5	Kaynardzha	6,000	Vasil Iliev	Independent
6	Sitovo	8,000	Nikola Georgiev	BSP
7	Tutrakan	23,000	Vergil Rusev	BSP

Totals: 1 township with 79,000 for the SDS; 3 townships with 36,000 for the BSP; 2 townships with 52,000 for the DPS; 1 township with 6,000 for an independent candidate.

Sliven Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Sliven	149,000	Khristan Petkov	SDS
2	Kotel	26,000	M. Karageorgiev	BSP
3	Nova Zagora	50,000	Georgi Kolev	BSP
4	Tvurditsa	17,000	Ivan Stoykov	BSP

Totals: 1 township with 149,000 for the SDS; 3 townships with 93,000 for the BSP.

Smolyan Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Smolyan	52,000	Dimitur Mikhaylov	BZNS-e
2	Banite	9,000	Rosen Boyanov	BSP
3	Borino	4,000	Ali Sayrov	DPS
4	Devin	17,000	Fedya Lazarev	SDS
5	Dospat	10,000	Muzafer Khiyavazov	BZNS-NP
6	Zlatograd	16,000	Ginka Kapitanova	SDS
7	Madan	20,000	Atanas Milev	SDS
8	Nedelino	9,000	Tsvyatko Keleshev	Independent
9	Rudozem	13,000	Nikolay Boyadzhiev	SDS
10	Chepelare	10,000	Kostadin Pepelanov	SDS

Totals: 5 townships with 76,000 for the SDS; 1 township with 9,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 10,000 for the BZNS-NP; 1 township with 52,000 for the BZNS-e; 1 township with 4,000 for the DPS; 1 township with 9,000 for an independent candidate.

Sofia City Electoral Districts

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Sofia	1,219,000	Prof. Aleksandur Yanchulev	SDS

Sofia Regional Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Anton	—	Tsonka Stefanova	BSP
2	Bozhurishte	8,000	Dr. Petko Petkov	SDS
3	Botevgrad	41,000	Dr. Tsvetan Gero	SDS
4	Godech	8,000	Nikolay Tashkov	SDS
5	Gorna Malina	8,000	Todor Ministerov	SDS
6	Dragoman	8,000	Gancho Stavrev	BSP

Sofia Regional Electoral District (Continued)

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
7	Elin Pelin	27,000	Georgi Markov	SDS
8	Etropole	15,000	Nikola Dochev	BSP
9	Zlatitsa	6,000	Tsenko Tsenkov	SDS
10	Ikhtiman	20,000	Kiril Karaivanov	SDS
11	Koprivshitsa	3,000	Dragolya Tatarliev	BSP
12	Kostenets	17,000	Krum Ivanov	SDS
13	Kostinbrod	19,000	Kosta Bozhinov	SDS
14	Mirkovo	3,000	Kharalampi Konchev	SDS
15	Pirdop	8,000	Rosen Iliev	BSP
16	Pravets	9,000	Pavel Pavlov	BSP
17	Samokov	52,000	Nikolay Kitov	SDS
18	Svoje	28,000	Pavel Matev	SDS
19	Slivnitsa	12,000	Asen Lilov	SDS
20	Chelopech	1,000	Stoyan Machulekov	SDS
21	Chavdar	1,500	Velko Gerov	BZNS-e

Totals: 14 townships with 250,000 for the SDS; 6 townships with 43,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 1,500 for the BZNS-e.

Stara Zagora Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Stara Zagora	185,000	Anton Andronov	SDS
2	Gulubovo	20,000	Subi Nedkov	BSP
3	Kazanluk	94,000	Boncho Sarafov	SDS
4	Muglitzh	26,000	Emil D. Toporkov	BSP
5	Opan	5,000	Ilcho G. Rusev	BSP
6	Pavel Banya	19,000	Todor K. Todorov	SDS
7	Radnevo	27,000	Georgi M. Kostov	BSP
8	Chirpan	31,000	Petur Petrov	SDS

Totals: 4 townships with 329,000 for the SDS; 4 townships with 78,000 for the BSP.

Turgovishte Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Turgovishte	71,000	Petur Karageorgiev	BSP
2	Antonovo	10,000	Todor Todorov	SDS
3	Makariopolsko	—	Petko Simeonov	BSP
4	Omurtag	30,000	Nezhvet Mollamustafov	DPS
5	Opaka	9,000	Sabri Akhmedov	DPS
6	Popovo	43,000	Lyudmil Veselinov	BSP

Totals: 1 township with 10,000 for the SDS; 3 townships with 114,000 (minus Makariopolsko) for the BSP; 2 townships with 39,000 for the DPS.

Khaskovo

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Khaskovo	116,000	Stoyan Iliev	SDS
2	Dimitrovgrad	79,000	Petur Naydenov	BSP
3	Ivaylovgrad	12,000	Angel Petrov	BSP

Khaskovo (Continued)

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
4	Lyubimets	13,000	Vasil N. Kozaliev	BSP
5	Madzharovo	5,000	Vulchan Todorov	BSP
6	Mineralni Bani	8,000	Georgi Georgiev	BSP
7	Svilengrad	27,000	Svetlin Prodanov	BSP
8	Simeonovgrad	12,000	Mariya Doncheva	BSP
9	Stambolovo	12,000	Guner F. Serbez	DPS
10	Topolovgrad	20,000	Petur Pashov	BSP
11	Kharmanli	33,000	Geno Genov	BSP

Totals: 1 township with 116,000 for the SDS; 9 townships with 209,000 for the BSP; 1 township with 12,000 for the DPS.

Shumen Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Shumen	125,000	Khristo Khristov	BSP
2	Venets	13,000	Zakir Kadir	DPS
3	Vurbitsa	13,000	Halmi Alza	Independent
4	Gara Khitrino	12,000	Gursel Halil	DPS
5	Kaolinovo	19,000	Ileydin Sali	DPS
6	Kaspichan	13,000	Nikolay Nikolov	BSP
7	Nikola Kozlevo	9,000	Necib Kurt	DPS
8	Novi Pazar	25,000	Valentin Angelov	BSP
9	Preslav	20,000	Zhelez Zhelezov	SDS
10	Smyadovo	10,000	Nedyu Dzhankov	SDS

Totals: 2 townships with 30,000 for the SDS; 3 townships with 163,000 for the BSP; 4 townships with 53,000 for the DPS; 1 township with 13,000 for an independent candidate.

Yambol Electoral District

	Township	Population	Mayor	Party
1	Yambol	98,000	Stoyan Stoyanov	SDS
2	Bolyarovo	8,000	Georgi Kirov	BSP
3	Voynika	—	Ivan Kurtev	BSP
4	Elkhovo	24,000	Atanas Chunchev	BSP
5	Skalitsa	—	Yanka Marmarova	BSP
6	Straldzha	19,000	Ivan Ivanov	BSP
7	Tenevo	—	Georgi Stratiev	Independent
8	Tundzha	36,000	Kostadin Georgiev	BSP

Totals: 1 township with 98,000 for the SDS; 6 townships with 87,000 (minus 2 townships) for the BSP; 1 township for an independent candidate.

Foreign Economic Relations Ministers on Trade

92BA0075A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Oct 91 p 4

[Interview with Atanas Paparizov, minister of foreign economic relations, by Petur Gornenski; place and date not given: "Our Exports Are Beginning To Exceed Imports"]

[Text] [Gornenski] What features characterize the changes in our foreign trade system?

[Paparizov] A system of diminishing restrictions was gradually introduced at the beginning of the year to replace the previously existing moratoriums. To begin with, prohibitions were replaced by export fees, which, in turn, were later eliminated; minimal prices were kept for some goods. Today we have quite a liberal export system. This system is contributing to increasing exports. At the same time, it makes it possible to take the necessary measures should a drastic worsening of the domestic market occur. The import system was also liberalized. Customs fees are the only restriction in this

area. This is a very rare occurrence in countries that are not developed and that are currently in transition. In Hungary, for example, a number of groups of import quotas have been retained. In our view, customs fees are the most objective and the least obstructing import instrument.

We must also point out that these changes not only eliminate all restrictions in the activities of private, state, and cooperative companies, but also, in practice, remove any control over investments our companies make abroad; essentially, this also eliminates the information we receive on investments made by foreigners in the country. Practical experience has indicated that the government and the parliament have gone quite far. The Council of Ministers has now accepted some of our proposals on introducing some controls, naturally based on criteria consistent with market principles. For example, an investments commission was created by the Council of Ministers. I assume that soon the National Bank will propose a mechanism for controlling the draining of convertible currency from the country, as stipulated in a draft resolution.

The resolution on encouraging exporters, which we submitted to the Council of Ministers but which is still being worked on, particularly in the area of the financial sources needed for its implementation, is very important.

[Gornenski] What was the impact of these changes on our foreign economic relations?

[Paparizov] This year, we note two conflicting trends in foreign economic relations. On one hand, there was a great shrinking of foreign trade after the breakdown of CEMA, and our access to commercial credit was cut off in connection with the moratorium on our payments. On the other, however, a favorable trend appeared in commerce as a whole: Our exports are already beginning to exceed imports. In the first eight months of the year, our exports totaled \$2.16 million, which was one-half of last year's exports. Imports dropped further, by 70 percent as compared to the same period last year, totaling \$1.86 billion. The sharpest decline was the drop in trade with East European countries, exports to which dropped by 71 percent and imports by 85 percent. The figures were even lower in our trade with the Soviet Union after we signed the lists of indicators. The situation concerning West European countries is more favorable. According to our data, exports to those countries dropped by no more than 15 percent, while imports declined by 50 percent. Here, as well, the fact that the conditions for our exporters were improved in the past few months was of great significance. As of 1 January, we have been granted preferential treatment by the European Community.

Let me point out, however, that we still lack any reliable customs statistics. In my view, our exports exceed the figures reported by traditional exporters by at least 20 percent. This view is based on data provided by our main Western partners, which indicate that there has

been no decline of 15 percent in our exports but that, conversely, they have increased.

[Gornenski] How do you respond to the charge that a number of goods are being exported at very low prices, despite the significant scarcity that remains on our market?

[Paparizov] Obviously, there are some reasons for such objections. The only way to control exports now is to declare them with customs documents. Unfortunately, we still have no system that could sum up the data contained in such customs declarations. We know that Ukase No. 56, which was amended by the end of last year, deprives the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the right to directly monitor the situation in imports and exports—that is, to issue import and export permits. Now we must rely on properly organized customs activity in order to clearly answer this question.

What we have been able to accomplish, given our present situation, is that, whenever the question is raised of exporting at rates below traditional prices, we apply the minimal export prices. We were able to accomplish this for virtually all foodstuffs and essential timber materials and other goods.

However, minimal prices and border control must also be strengthened by control applied by the bank over the payment documents themselves because violations may be committed after the various amounts have been declared.

[Gornenski] What have been the most difficult things facing the ministry since the beginning of the year?

[Paparizov] In a coalition government such as ours, suspicions or neglect are inevitable. I believe that the work of the government for almost a full year resulted in the development of mechanisms for interaction and a spirit of respect. Naturally, rivalries among ministries exist in any government. I could say that the most difficult matter we had to surmount was the view that existed at the start that there be no commercial-economic advisers but that, instead, they be full members of embassies and not receive instructions directly from the ministry. Incidentally, this was not the first time that occurred. At the start of the 1980's, there was a similar idea that led to a number of problems. At that time, the idea was implemented and caused the loss of many buildings and a great deal of money and a waste of property. However, with the present government, this idea was insistently suggested, and, in the final account, a sensible option was found without plunging to extremes. I cannot say that I am pleased by the fact that our personnel abroad were reduced by 50 percent, while personnel doing strictly diplomatic work were reduced by only 20 percent. I cannot say that that was a sensible decision. Nonetheless, it marked a more constructive solution than simply terminating everything and then starting to think about how to recreate everything anew.

MDF Spokesman Proposes New Retribution Plan

92CH0084B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 12 Oct 91 pp 72-73

[Article by Gabor Juhasz: "Justitia's Scale: A New Program of 'Serving Justice'"]

[Text] News of a program for "serving justice" more severe than all previous ones emanate from the MDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum's] populist-nationalist circles. This scale program was not disavowed by the largest ruling party (even though its leader stated that he agrees only with the basic idea), so it is hard to determine whether we are seeing the individual action of a single MDF deputy. In any event, the initiator is not alone: Last week Jozsef Torgyan proposed that anyone who was a MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] member should not be allowed to occupy a leadership position.

"The MAGYAR FORUM is my pond lily," a reader of Csurka's weekly began his letter in the 3 October issue. But Andras Feher of Szentendre did not become known as the writer of a lyrical letter: Rather, this spokesman of the MDF's local populist-nationalist circle thought up the latest plan for "serving justice," the scale program, which is now being circulated among members of the ruling party.

As is customary with similar plans, the "Scale Program for Justice" starts from the idea that systemic change has been left incomplete, and the "guardians of old" can be found everywhere. As the writer describes the state of affairs, "this time they are protected by banks, 'a global press' associated with embezzled money, and former policemen who now wear dinner jackets." Thus, the gist of Andras Feher's proposal is to "take persons responsible for the gravest damage and liable to pay compensation, place them into subordinate positions until such time when those previously disadvantaged achieve sufficient power, to redistribute unfairly acquired properties among the disadvantaged, and, after a certain amount of time, to allow the temporarily disadvantaged strata to prove themselves." It is not surprising to read a subsequent statement by the author, according to which "compared to the crimes perpetrated, this proposal is exceedingly generous."

In fact, the judicial objective of the scale plan is the enactment of a "decree or temporary regulation" removing from power and influence those individuals whom present legislators consider to be men of the old order, while also select the method of redistribution and compensation. These issues in themselves are, of course, not new: In one form or another they appeared in nearly every previous proposal on serving justice. However, the populist-nationalist functionary from Szentendre has developed even the smallest details involved. To be sure, he considers the proposal in its present form to be "a working copy to be developed in the course of broad popular debate," and also wants to utilize the talents of experts in formulating the final proposal. (In the everyday world, Andras Feher is a physicist, and an

associate of the Central Physical Research Institute.) Still, even in its preliminary form the proposal precisely defines the circle of those who would be subject to pay compensation, fittingly distinguishing them into groups labelled "AVH1," "AVH2," "AVH3," and "AVH-EB." "Group 1" would include "minor culprits," such as those who were, simply stated, at least heads of chief departments, colonels in the armed forces, or editors in chief between 1980 and 15 March 1990. "Group 2" would be made up those from the above category who were also MSZMP-members for at least three years and party functionaries above the rank of department head and the independent MSZMP secretaries of larger enterprises and institutions. According to the Szentendre arbitrator, "group 3" would include those who belonged to the cabinets or the Politburo or Central Committee of the MSZMP between 1 January 1950 and 15 March 1990. The classification is quite flexible, because anyone at all could be placed in the forth, the so-called "lettered," group (AVH-EB). This part of the scale plan seems to embody Istvan Csurka's proposal, according to which we should examine what anyone did to oppose systemic changes during the past year or two; after all, we could place into this category those elected state and trade union functionaries who are today protecting the interests of the above mentioned "AVH-strata."

The program also determines the degrees of "serving justice." For example, those in "group 3" could get only average-size apartments and pensions, while those in "group 1" and "group 2" would have to repay all premiums earned by them between 1980 and 1990, now classified as undeserved earnings. Moreover, those in "group 2" and "group 3" could only work as employees for the next few years. (Last Saturday, at the Somogy county meeting of Smallholders, Jozsef Torgyan made a proposal similar to this scale plan: He called on the National Assembly to prohibit any former MSZMP member from holding leadership posts for five years.) The author of the scale plan hopes that his proposal will be made into law as a result of signature collection or plebiscite. Obeying the law he conceived (as "the demands of people's reign") would be the duty of each citizen, and under its provisions any office-holder who were to disagree with this law could be dismissed without any specific procedure.

Of course, the plan is not likely to reach that status; at least not while the Hungarian Republic is a democracy. This is because, even though points of this program bear some similarity to the Justitia and Konya proposals, it is still possible that the whole matter is nothing more than the brain-child of a local MDF functionary. Still, it is possible that a well-phrased question could entice tens or hundreds of thousands to sign a petition in support of the scale plan, thus keeping alive a sense of vulnerability in a sizeable portion of our society. Nor is it inconceivable that the whole thing is nothing more than a manipulated political trial balloon, enabling the largest governing party to gauge reaction among the voters, as well as among state administrators, to a potential radical

proposal to "serve justice." And in the event the affair became too uncomfortable, it could be blamed on an over-eager party member.

However, the scale program has a notably novel aspect. In contrast to proponents of previous MDF plans, the author of this conception is clearly aware of the fact (even though he does not say it) that, among others, the National Assembly itself could oppose the realization of this kind of plans. This is just why the plan's proponents (even though they never cast doubts over the legitimacy of the legislative body) would early on like to resort to a plebiscite, in order to force ratification of the scale plan. They are planning to create a foundation to prepare the referendum, and began to solicit contributions at Andras Feher's address.

Of course, the "working draft's" preparer also thought of gaining the support of deputies, so he did not neglect their past. Not only would he allow "minor communists" to escape; with an elegant gesture, he would place the legislators beyond the scale law's reach, thus "sparing" them (including several members of the MDF fraction) of the loss of position and property. And being a good MDF member, it is only natural that he similarly "exempts" members of the coalition cabinet from consequences of this law that is designed to serve justice.

SZDSZ's Political Isolation Discussed

92CH0084A Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
5 Oct 91 pp 5-6

[Article by F. Havas-Koszeg-Solt: "There Are Ways Out"]

[Text] This week's major event in domestic politics was the announcement by Janos Kis, the president of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], to resign his post. Consequently, this time we are also focussing our attention to the internal affairs of the SZDSZ.

The democratic opposition movement of the former East Germany, which for decades faced arrests, house searches, and expulsions, and in the autumn of 1989 called hundreds of thousands to the streets, together with the Western Greens occupies twelve seats in the Parliament of unified Germany. In Czechoslovakia, the Civic Forum, formed from the Charter 77 movement, achieved an overwhelming victory in the election, but as soon as party infighting began the circle of former Charter members became a minority in the federal legislative body. In Poland, the coming elections will reveal how strong is Mazowiecki's Christian-liberal coalition in contrast to the conservative-Christian-populist block. However, no matter how it will do at the polls, it is certain that the former democratic opposition (the party of Geremek and Michnik) is only a portion of the Mazowiecki camp.

A Large Liberal Party

Only in Hungary did the democratic opposition develop into a large liberal party. Undoubtedly, it was the plebiscite of the four "ayes" that turned the small organization of the SZDSZ, mocked as a "pseudo-liberal mini-party," into a large political body, combined with the facts that the SZDSZ initiated and stimulated the mass movement involved in the systemic transformation, and only the SZDSZ appeared as the radical and consistent opponent of the Communist state-party. At the same time, it would be cynical of us to attribute the SZDSZ's success exclusively to these factors. Even during its pre-history, the SZDSZ revealed steady consistency in creating contacts, broadening its scope and increasing its membership. The samizdat-publishing radical opposition built an increasingly close intellectual and political alliance with the newer generations of radically critical intelligentsia, which in turn maintained ties with the ruling party's internal opposition. When the SZDSZ was formed, most members of this intelligentsia found a natural home in the new party. Moreover, the moment of creating the party has also brought about a certain shift: There were free-market and liberal-oriented groups, whose interests were also at stake here, who were among the SZDSZ's founding members. They were the ones, among others, who prevented the SZDSZ (choosing its name around that time) from defining itself as a mere radical democratic political sect. It is a commonly known fact that at the turn of 1989-90 the rapidly growing party recruited its members from the Western-oriented intellectual elite, that is the upper middle classes, and from the most heatedly antiregime workers and employees, that is the strata located right below the middle classes. At the same time, it would be unjust of analysts to forget about the mass of self-made men, the small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, the taxi drivers, the restaurateurs, the small shop owners, and the software vendors, who lived the liberal lifestyle and who continue to remain the most active SZDSZ members to this day.

The End of Recurring Successes

It was not the spring electoral defeat that ended the series of successes, but the aftermath of victory at last autumn's balloting for local governments. The SZDSZ did not foresee that disappointment with the government would put it in positions of authority in so many locations. Organizations dealing with the problems of local administration began to develop in the meanwhile; however, by that time scandal after scandal was revealed even in SZDSZ-dominated local governing bodies.

At the level of national politics, the strategy of offensive which the membership as well as the BESZELO called for, did not bring any success. The crumbling coalition of ruling parties became terrified, pulled itself together, and showed remarkable assertiveness in occupying every position of power, confident that, in spite of its dwindling popularity, its possession of those posts could help it win the next elections.

Just about a year ago the SZDSZ members in the National Assembly chose a new leader. Seeing that this took place immediately after the victory in the local elections, this would have been a tactical error even if the procedure were entirely free of objections. The problem is complicated by the fact that to this day we could not clarify what political differences existed between Tolgyessy and the other SZDSZ leaders. The membership never recovered from this trauma, even though in the meanwhile Tolgyessy was bested by Ivan Peto in a fair contest.

According to the results of the latest public opinion surveys, the SZDSZ's mass support fell to 18 percent. Of course, this number is devastating when compared to the surge accomplished by the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]; on the other hand, one can always interpret this to mean that the SZDSZ's electoral base is stabilized at around 20 percent. Unlike the FIDESZ, the SZDSZ has more than 800 local organizations. The example of the contest at Szerencs demonstrates that it is nearly impossible to win elections without local organizations. In other words, if the elections were held tomorrow, the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ would end up neck to neck. The government still considers the pressure exerted by the SZDSZ's political presence as a source of panic. So what are the causes for worry?

Without Partners

The greatest problem of the SZDSZ today is that it is without partners. One important element of winning the plebiscite of the four "ayes" was the creation of a temporary coalition with the FIDESZ, the Smallholders, and the Social Democrats, leaving the MDF alone with the decaying MSZMP. It appears that Jozsef Antall has learned a lesson: It is said that the Museum of Medical History keeps champagne on ice for Smallholder functionaries who may drop in at all hours of the day. The FIDESZ loudly protests any attempt to being lumped together with the SZDSZ as part of a "liberal opposition." One can only surmise from their political tactics and their actions that following the next elections Viktor Orban and his circle would form a coalition with the Christian Democrats and the weakened MDF. As a consequence, the public feels that the SZDSZ is not an alternative political force and has no chance of becoming the governing party.

Undoubtedly, a party can resign itself to remain an opposition force for a long time and still retain its strength. However, this can be guaranteed only if it can rely on a stable, inherited electoral basis, or a body of voters who are convinced that, in spite of its opposition status, the party is effective in struggling to represent their interests.

For the time being, the SZDSZ cannot count on such devoted voters. In the absence of hope for victory and a guaranteed promise of political support, lasting commitment to a party is held only by those who are attracted by the party's spirit and ideology. And if we look at this, a

recent survey (commissioned by the Institute of Political Studies, a body quite close to the SZDSZ) reveals that only 12 percent of the SZDSZ membership were consistently liberal views, while 15 percent are expressly antiliberal, and the remainder's thinking contains a mix of reformist, authoritarian, and "national-liberal" views.

There is a great danger that without partners the SZDSZ will shrink to become a bourgeois radical-intellectual party, similar to the one led by Oszkar Jaszai. The only way it could avoid this fate is by exhibiting openings toward the parties with which it could maintain temporary or lasting collaboration.

Upon surveying the lineup of parties, it appears that the FIDESZ is the least interested in forming such a partnership. After all, even today the FIDESZ's liberalism, dynamics and professionalism gains expression only in contrast to the SZDSZ. As a traditionalist organization, the Smallholders' Party is opposed to the modern SZDSZ. Even though there are several leaders who may be open to such a suggestion, a rapprochement with the Smallholders is the least likely eventuality.

One Variant

The SZDSZ could ally itself with a social democratic party, if such a thing existed. However, similarly to the other postcommunist societies, no significant social democratic party came into existence in Hungary. The SZDSZ exhibits strong tendencies to fill this void itself. To be sure, the majority of party members would object to being called social democrats; however, their choice of values is not far removed from that of social democracy. Obviously, there are two ways to fill this vacuum: Either the party's organizations succeed in reaching the masses of workers who face increasingly difficult living conditions and are thus turning away from political activity, or they must collaborate with the trade unions. The first course is unlikely to be chosen because it would imply making contact with that one-third of society that has not been participating in elections; and the second one because in the past the well-organized old trade unions were not considered by the SZDSZ as the employees' legitimate representatives.

The opening by the Social Democrats makes it inevitable that relationships with the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] be settled. However, a large portion of SZDSZ members refuses to hear of collaboration with the MSZP. And this is not a mere emotional tradition inherited from the years before the systemic change: The above cited opinion survey reveals that even on such fundamental issues as the privatization of state-owned enterprises and lands, or subsidizing Western investments, it is the views of MSZP voters that deviates most from those held by SZDSZ voters. The Socialists' aggressive stance taken in defense of the MSZOSZ's [National Organization of Hungarian Trade Unions] property privileges placed additional obstacles in the way of this rapprochement. Still, it is clear that the SZDSZ cannot prohibit an opening toward the MSZP much longer. At

certain local governmental organs, this alliance has already been realized. Obviously, the dialogue would be made easier if the Socialists' leaders inherited from the one-party state, regardless of their prestige, were to be replaced by the party's intellectuals who hold social democratic convictions. Conversely, the SZDSZ needs leaders who see potential collaboration not as an ideological and moral issue, but primarily one of practical politics.

A Second Variant

A no less touchy course, which nevertheless should not be discarded, is the one involving a rapprochement towards the ruling parties. The easier choice would be the Christian Democrats: The SZDSZ's relationship with them is less poisoned than with the MDF, and they need the external support, since their local organizations compete primarily with the MDF. Of all Christian Democratic efforts, it is the Roman Catholic Church's energetic drive to secular power that is most objectionable to the SZDSZ; within the party this is most strenuously opposed by the liberalism of Protestants and those of other denominations.

When it comes to anti-MDF feelings within the SZDSZ, since last spring these are almost as strong as the anti-MSZP ones; yet this does not preclude local collaboration. As we have written it several times on these pages, we oppose not only this government, but also the system which this government is trying to develop. We are fairly accurate in presupposing that Jozsef Antall would like to see Hungary as a well-managed, centrally controlled country that devoutly respects authority. The dream of Dr. Antall coincides with that of Count Istvan Bethlen, while Istvan Csurka dreams along the lines of Bela Imredy. Of course, the two contrasting views managed to find common ground in the past; their convergence in our time, however, owes much to an exaggerated fear of the SZDSZ. Perhaps the sole force that binds the ruling coalition together is a hatred of the SZDSZ, just as the nationalist tendencies of inter-war Central Europe shared anti-Semitism, even while they were snarling at each other. If the SZDSZ's radical liberalism were less feared, perhaps the MDF could discard aggressive populism in favor of its original gentlemanly conservatism.

This is a question not so much of theoretical decision, but one of being on speaking terms at all levels; not only in the villages, but also in every committee of the National Assembly, in open meetings, and even in the prime minister's office. To a certain extent, interparty politics always take place behind the scenes; however, this should not mean that any leader can make final decisions based on nothing but his private intuition and ambitions.

Thus, there are two potential courses for the SZDSZ. It could become a left-center party, or a centrist liberal party opening its doors to a variety of views. In one variety, it needs a partner with Social Democratic accreditation. To realize the other, there should be less conflict of ideology and style between the SZDSZ and the ruling parties. In this case, the MDF would become a little more conservative and nationalist, and the SZDSZ a little more modern and cosmopolitan; otherwise, however, there would be no great conflicts between the two. The danger of the first variant is that it would remain a nostalgic dream, just as Jaszi's bourgeois radicals had an unquenchable desire for a Social Democratic party that suited their taste. The second variant holds the threat that a softened SZDSZ, even if it will not crumble, will shrivel away next to the MDF.

A Dynamic Balance!

Both variants have attracted individual devotees. However, it may be too early to make a choice. There is still two and a half years until the next legislative elections. There may be as much as a year during which the chances could be weighed. The optimal situation would be if the SZDSZ's new leadership would embody a temporary compromise, a dynamic balance, between the two variants. Of course, this would require partners who are receptive of a compromise.

Talleyrand said after Napoleon departed the scene that to make politics in the future Europe would be a boring endeavor. Choosing among the various roads and false roads as an SZDSZ member may be somewhat more entertaining. But will Janos Kis be able to ensure, even though he is somewhat retired, that liberal politics safeguard its intellectual prestige and moral purity?

Election Results May Slow Pace of Reforms

92EP0058A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Oct 91 p 15

[Article by J.H.: "Heavy Legacy for Polish Economy; Polish Economic Council: Shock Therapy of Previous Government Left Everyone Frustrated"]

[Text] Vienna—The outcome of the parliamentary elections in Poland will make it difficult for the person responsible for the economy to pursue an effective and viable economic policy. This opinion was expressed by Witold Trzeciakowski, the chairman of the Economic Council of the outgoing government in an interview with this newspaper. Poland needs a very strong government to cope with the consequences both of the communist period and the mistaken belief in the healing power of the shock therapy. In looking back to the time of the so-called Balcerowicz plan, Trzeciakowski expressed the opinion in Vienna that the shock therapy did result in the desired stabilization, but had devastating side effects in other respects.

The economic program now has only very little support among the people. In the earlier semifree elections in 1989 many had voted for Solidarity in hopes of a quick improvement of their standard of living. Now many more Poles believe that the situation in the country will continue to deteriorate: In March 47 percent held this opinion, in the last poll before the elections, 59 percent. It must be remembered, Trzeciakowski said, that after 45 years of communism, the Poles are an "indoctrinated people," who have lost the spirit of enterprise, do not accept open unemployment, and place equality above property.

The Economic Council expects an accelerated shrinkage of industrial production for the coming months. In 1991 it will be 12 to 18 percent below the already low level of 1990. The reduction could be slowed down early in 1992 if the efforts for greater exports to the Soviet Union are successful. The gross domestic product will decline 8 to 12 percent. In agriculture the Economic Council expects a relatively small shrinkage of about 2.5 percent. Real income should decline by 3 percent; the number of unemployed should rise to about 2.1 million. The sole growth sector is the telecommunications field where 227,000 additional subscriber telephone lines are to be created with the help of Western infrastructure credits.

Trzeciakowski counted the dynamic growth of the private economy among the positive developments of the past three years. In June 1991, 1.27 million small enterprises had been registered, 12 percent more than at the end of 1990. Most of them continue to be from the trade and services sector. Three-fourths of the retail stores and four-fifths of the retail sales in the meantime are in the private sector. The share of the private sector in Polish exports is around 14 percent, which is three times that of last year. Private commercial enterprises even handle 42

percent of the imports. In the meantime the share of private industry in industrial production is just under 20 percent.

According to Trzeciakowski, the development of the foreign trade since the devaluation of the zloty is also satisfactory. The inclination to save has increased since the interest rate is higher than the rate of inflation. The confidence in the Polish currency is increasing. The share of the zloty deposits has increased from 50 to 70 percent since December 1990. The rate of inflation is slowing down. According to Trzeciakowski's data, it was just under 26 percent in the first quarter; the Economic Council now figures on 80 percent for the year. Trzeciakowski counts especially the radical liberalization of the foreign trade among the failures in the framework of the shock therapy. The market was opened up without being assured of the entry to the market in the West in return. Serious mistakes were also made with respect to privatization because it was first believed it would take place quickly and therefore any industrial policy was abandoned.

In many respects the economic reformers should have set a slower pace, Trzeciakowski said, and should have paid attention to social acceptability. But he did not want to blame the International Monetary Fund. Poland should have negotiated a more moderate adjustment program instead of playing the role of the star pupil.

Construction Initiative With USSR

92P20050A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY
AND LAW supplement) in Polish 14 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Malgorzata Szyslo: "Construction Symposium: Joint Participation at Soviet Markets"]

[Text] There are presently several dozen Polish construction firms employing from ten to twenty thousand employees at construction sites in the Soviet Union. According to specialists from the Ministry of Land Use Management and Construction, the export of construction services may be doubled.

"The vast market beyond our eastern border needs multi-billion investment. These investments are in the interest of the Western governments, since they economically and politically stabilize the situation in Europe and the world. Those interested in investing in the Soviet Union are of course firms from many nations, counting on considerable profits," said Minister Adam Glapinski, who told RZECZPOSPOLITA, "Polish construction industries, thanks to many years of experience and a good knowledge of the work conditions in this country, have all the data in order to become an attractive partner for Western investors and construction firms. Working together, construction may be undertaken quickly and cheaply, while at the same time maintaining high Western standards.

"Our construction firms offer a vast range of services: from the upgrading of industrial sites and residential

dwellings, through installation services, hydraulic engineering, supply and installation of steel structures to land surveying, transport, and dwelling repairs."

The promotion of joint European-Polish construction services on the Soviet market will take place at a symposium titled "Building-West-Poland-East Construction," organized on the 14-15 of October in Warsaw. Invited to attend were several dozen Polish enterprises, exporters, manufacturers, and investors, as well as manufacturers from West European countries. Also invited were potential contracting parties from the Soviet Union, including representatives from the republics, unions, and trusts.

Large Cocaine Cargo Confiscated in Gdynia

92WD0097A Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish
No 41, 12 Oct 91 pp 1, 7

[Article by Cezary Maczka: "Cocaine"]

[Text] The largest cache of narcotics in the history of Polish crime fighting has been confiscated in Gdynia.

On 20 September, at about 6 o'clock, the 4,000-ton semi-container Polonia, which belongs to the Polish Ocean Lines, appeared on the road in Gdynia. The ship was returning from a three-month voyage between the ports of Europe and those of South America. After receiving approval from the port authorities, it docked at a container terminal on the Polish wharf. Soon, after a routine customs check, the unloading began. There was no indication that soon a big stir would be created....

Tri-City law enforcement officials rightly considered the seizure of 109.2 kilograms [kg] of cocaine, valued at 15 million German marks [DM], to have been a success. The decision was made to turn the story to advantage, informing reporters of the inside story of the finding of the load.

News of the leak reached Gdansk via Interpol from Czechoslovakia, where several dozen kilograms of the deadly powder hidden in a package containing beans had been confiscated earlier. On 1 November, at 11 o'clock, the combined forces of officials from the Gdynia Customs Office and from the operations-reconnaissance department of the Voivodship Police Command embarked upon the operation of finding the drugs. Without a hitch they found the right container, which also suggests that Interpol has a highly conspired agent within the cartel.

The cocaine was found in Euro-pallets, specifically in their load-bearing parts—the ground beams. They were accordingly hollowed out and inside were placed aluminum containers measuring 15 x 5 x 5 cm. When police and customs officials broke open 60 pallets, they found 546 metal containers. When these were opened they were found to contain plastic bags filled with a white powder. When they did the ad hoc Scott test, they were left with no doubt that this was pure, high-quality cocaine.

Immediately after nightfall, a second container from Colombia was opened in the expectation that it, too, would contain the "white powder." But it turned out that it was loaded with packages of tea. The packages were not large, but the weight made it impossible to hide drugs effectively.

If we analyze the method used to hide the cocaine, we are led to conclude that the transport was prepared by professionals. The slightest detail was observed; thin plywood which did not differ in color from the rest of the wood was glued on over the tops of the ground beams; a part of the wooden blocks was empty, which provided an opportunity to save the cargo in the event of a customs check. Nor did the exemplary completion of the transport documents arouse the suspicions of officials. Unfortunately, those conducting the conference were not eager to reveal who was the recipient of the package. They covered themselves with the traditional statement: "The good of the investigation does not allow us to divulge this information."

In this instance the police clearly undervalued the reporters. A young reporter from WIECZOR WYBRZEZA successfully gained access to all data. And the fact that this reporter learned this information before the prosecuting attorney who supervised the investigation lends an air of piquancy to the whole matter.

The consignor of the containers was the Colombian firm Gromarko Ltd. The goods were loaded on the ship at the port of Cartagena. They were placed into two 40-foot containers. These contained pallets with beans and packages of tea. The consignee was the company Racio Impex, which imports food and has its headquarters in Czechoslovakia in the town of Hradec-Kralowce. But the Sperapid Limited Liability Co. in Gdynia dealt with the cargo transfer. This specialized enterprise acts as middleman in expediting goods unloaded in Polish ports which are then transported to Czechoslovakia. However, the company is not responsible for land transport. It still has not been determined who was to transport the load to Hradec and how this was to be done.

The employees of Sperapid claimed that this was the first shipment of beans to Czechoslovakia that had passed through their hands. Until now our southern neighbors imported this product from China. This does not mean, however, that they did not have prior contact with Racio Impex. In recent months this firm, with the help of the Polish broker, had carried small transports of sugar and rice. Experts on cargo transport claim that bags of these articles are transported on wooden pallets. Were they stuffed with drugs? Unfortunately, this question must go unanswered at present.

Likewise the question of why the cocaine was sent to Czechoslovakia remains a puzzle. In all likelihood it is because this country was only a stop on the road. Anything else would be improbable because 1 kg of drugs circulating in the retail network costs about 150,000 DM. Neither Poland's nor Czechoslovakia's drug addicts

can afford to lay out such sums. Thus, we may presume that the "white powder" was slated for the Austrian market or the market of other Western countries.

The statistical data revealed by law enforcement officials shows that Poland has become an object of interest among narcotics cartels. Our country is used primarily as a transfer route to West Europe. Of late more and more has been said about the three secret laboratories that produce amphetamines (synthetic narcotics formerly known under the name "psychedrine" were distributed legally in the pharmacy network). They are probably located on the Coast. This would be the logical extension of the cases being handled by the Gdansk police, which is currently making a thorough study of the transfer channels to Denmark and Sweden.

In May of this year in Oslo an Interpol session was held, dedicated to combating drug abuse. Unfortunately, the conclusions drawn during this session are not good news for us. Experts from the International Criminal Police Organization proved that Polish-manufactured amphetamines are enjoying a tremendous demand on Western markets. The secret lies in a trade secret: Our products are of higher quality in this regard than even the technologies used by criminals from the United States, Colombia, or Japan.

Poland is likewise not ready to combat this type of pathological phenomena. We lack the professional cadres, the equipment, and, above all, the legal regulations. For example, we have not ratified certain international conventions. Moreover, in the 1986 document there is an extremely important regulation treating of so-called control flushing. This makes it possible for police from states-signers of the convention to supervise illegal transports if this may lead to uncovering producers and contacts.

It was necessary to join Interpol if only to make possible the exchange of information (the present case is an example of the effectiveness of such cooperation). However, it cannot be treated as a panacea for all ills. It is necessary to set up closer cooperation with the police forces of neighboring states....

On 9 October, the ship Jastarnia Bor will make its way to Gdynia. This ship set out from Cartagena, where a container of 840 sacks (21 tons) of cacao was loaded on its deck. This time the recipient of the goods is the firm Racio Impex from Ulrichovo in Czechoslovakia. Will the shipment be stuffed with drugs this time as well?

Call To Combat Narcotics Traffic With Ordinances
92WD0097B Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish
No 41, 12 Oct 91 p 7

[Article by Janina Majer: "The Gangs and the Ants"]

[Text] Is Poland really becoming the world center for drug smuggling?

The smuggling of narcotics via Poland was one of the hot press items in recent weeks. It began with a report about the danger of the international amphetamine trade. Amphetamine is one of the most dangerous drugs, and unexpectedly its production has become a Polish specialty. Recently the press (and our papers as well) reported the thwarting of an attempt to smuggle 93 capsules of heroin in the stomachs of two young Polish couriers. And recently also an innocent-looking container on the ship Polonia loaded with Euro-pallets of beans turned out to be a hiding place for 109.2 kilograms [kg] of cocaine.

Officials from the Operations-Detection Bureau at the Main Police Command, a bureau that deals with detecting organized crime, however, admonish against the demonization of the problem. These recent spectacular thwarted attempts to smuggle a larger amount of narcotics took place after a gap of several years. More than 10 years have passed since the discovery of a large load of heroin (nearly 50 kg) on the Polish ship Wladyslawowo. The seizure of several packages of heroin smuggled in the boots of Sri Lankian citizens in 1983 was also memorable. After this, relative calm ensued at border crossings for several years. It was "relative calm," because according to those in the know, an "antlike" transfer of a significant amount of narcotics smuggled by the Poles and by foreign visitors to our country, most often from Asia, the Far East, and Africa, existed during this entire period.

The opening of the borders and the increase in tourist traffic and in trade through the central region of Europe, including through the former socialist countries—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—created new possibilities for organized crime, which includes drug traffickers. What has made the danger all the greater is that according to Interpol assessments, deliveries of narcotics from the Far East and South America to the United States have declined significantly, while interest in West European markets has risen. Suffice it to say that in the first half-year of 1991, about six tons of cocaine alone was smuggled into the countries of West Europe. According to Interpol data, this constituted an increase of 1,400 percent over that of the same period last year.

The center for the smuggling of narcotics is concentrated in Dutch and Spanish ports, as well as in Portugal. Poland, like the other countries of Central Europe, is one of the transit routes, but it is in no way the most important one, and, as the people from the Main Police Command tell me, it is not an easy route for drug dealers. Recent thwarted smuggling attempts attest to the fact that careful checks are made at border crossings and that dealers must expect the worst, with the resulting consequences that certain channels will be "burned out," at least for a time. Of course, one must always consider

the danger that the place that is out of commission will be replaced by another channel (and this has sometimes happened).

"We are assessing the extent of the danger calmly, but that does not mean that we are trivializing it," says Tadeusz Golas, department chief at the Main Police Command Operations-Detection Bureau. Both the police and the other services dealing in drug-related crime detection know full well how difficult it is to detect crimes perpetrated by organized groups of dealers and producers. For this reason, cooperation among domestic services—the police, the Border Guard, and the Office of State Protection—is necessary, as is international cooperation within the Interpol framework. It was possible to foil the smuggling attempt of the drug-contaminated beans in the Gdynia port because of the signals transmitted via Interpol and because of cooperation with the Czechoslovakian police. At the same time, the information must be reliable to make it possible for the police and the customs service to act with near certainty.

The search for contaminated goods in the busy Gdansk or Szczecin port may be compared to finding the proverbial needle in the haystack. Everything is fine if the operation succeeds, but if, for example, the police unsuccessfully tear apart a 40-ton container, the port authorities immediately complain and questions arise about whom to saddle with the costs. Moreover, so-called operations activities, including the observation of groups of people known to the police as consignees, consignors, and dealers, sometimes last a very long time before police get on the right track.

My interviewees give little information on the specifics of their work. They claim that making public narcotics cases and offenses hinders their work more than it helps them. For this reason, they have little to say about discovering secret laboratories in which amphetamines are produced or about cutting off other routes of transit smuggling. Often information in the press becomes a warning signal for a criminal group. These are tight-knit, closely connected, ruthless groups, just as they are all over the world, although they are certainly not yet as specialized as their colleagues in the United States and in West Europe.

We must expect that the wave of narcotics crime—production, smuggling, and drug trafficking, which has been so much on the rise in West Europe—will also reach us in a hurry. No one can guarantee that the criminal gangs that deal today in trading stolen cars, for example, will not shift over to narcotics trafficking. It is not ruled

out that the increase in the affluence of certain communities in Poland, including young people, will not bring potential clients to dealers who are no longer happy with heroin. The police and other services must be prepared for such an eventuality as well.

To be prepared means to be equipped with the proper equipment and experts, with helpers who are reliable in most instances, i.e., properly trained dogs. Meanwhile, there is a shortage of police personnel. Suffice it so say that in the Main Command, a total of four people make up this division. In addition, compared with the equipment of Western services, our equipment resembles a cottage industry.

True, other services also deal with detecting crimes related to drug smuggling, but given the increased threat, the need to better coordinate their activities is growing. It may be appropriate to create a specialized organ to oversee the entire gamut of narcomania-related affairs, just as is done, e.g., in the FRG and in France.

The law on narcomania that has been in effect since 1985 is an ineffectual weapon against new phenomena in drug crime.

The problem of a lack of sanctions against those who possess narcotics and use them, but against whom there is no proof of their trafficking in drugs, smuggling them, or producing them (which is a problem that has been brought up in this newspaper), significantly complicates the effective thwarting of the actions of the narcomanical fringe of society. Gaps in our law, including the law on the pharmaceuticals trade, make it impossible to implement the two international conventions that Poland has already signed—the 1961 convention on stupefactive agents and the 1971 convention on psychotropic agents.

In the opinion of my interviewees from the Main Police Command, many public prosecutors still do not know what obligations devolve upon Poland as a result of its membership in Interpol, nor do they want to hand down decisions regarding the arrest of criminals who are being pursued, for example, through international warrants of arrest without prior agreement through diplomatic channels. There is obviously no need to prove how tremendously this hampers prompt action by the police.

Those countries that have experienced, with greater pain than Poland, the dangers related to organized crime, including narcomania, long ago adapted their legal regulations to their needs.

We ought to follow their footsteps and update the narcomania law, instead of waiting for the next wave of narcotics to flow in.

Rupel Comments on Country's Declaration

92P20053A Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK
in Slovene 9 Nov 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Measures Bring Us No Surprise"]

[Excerpt] Ljubljana, 9 Nov—[passage omitted] Minister Rupel has commented on the Declaration on Yugoslavia: "We haven't been surprised by the measures because we have expected them and made preparations. Because the Declaration contains precisely those steps which our partners in the European Community and the bilateral talks have already announced. The Declaration puts us in a rather complicated situation, in which our Ministry will have to take action with regard to responding to this document. Other sectors in the Slovene government will have to take a stand as well. Our economic offices will have to clearly define those points which exempt Slovenia."

Minister Rupel has stressed that Slovenia enjoys first-rate economic relations with the European Community, to which it has exported 69 percent and imported 62 percent of its trade this year, a fact that bears great significance for Slovenia.

"We see that in the conclusions of the ministerial meeting the culprits for the existing situation and the war in Croatia are not mentioned, although at the last session Lord Carrington declared that the culprit would be named shortly. Slovenia has repeatedly denounced the actions of the Federation, Serbia, and the Yugoslav Army. Even though we have reservations regarding the actions of neighboring Croatia, we cannot avoid the fact that Croatia is conducting a defensive war," Dr. Rupel added.

The present situation should not be allowed to threaten plans for an independent Slovenia in any way. However, it is clear that the Foreign Ministry is striving for a global solution to the crisis. Dr. Rupel hopes that the Hague conference will succeed, which in his opinion means the disassociation of Slovenia from Yugoslavia and its international recognition. He views the Declaration mainly as a blow to the Federation since it constitutes an annulment of the international recognition of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the door is being opened for relations on a different basis between the Yugoslav republics and the members of the European Community.

The conference alone cannot start implementing the adopted sanctions. However, a special commission will probably meet on Monday to implement the measures.

As regards the oil and arms embargo, Dr. Rupel said that the Community and its members would request from the member states that are also UN Security Council members to appeal to the Security Council to adopt further measures in order to implement the oil embargo. The Security Council decision has not been made known yet.

Dr. Rupel also said that the oil and arms embargo is a more "remote" matter, while Slovenia had to "reckon" with the economic measures.

Belgrade Professor on Serbian Ethnic Borders

92BA0103D Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian
11 Oct 91 pp 4-7

[Interview with Dr. Jovan Ilic, professor, by Milivoje Andjelkovic; place and date not given: "Serbian Ethnic Borders and a Third Yugoslavia"]

[Text] How are the borders of the Serbian areas in Croatia to be determined? What are the possible demarcations of a Third Yugoslavia? We talked about this with Dr. Jovan Ilic, professor in the School of Geography of Belgrade University and president of the Serbian Geographic Society. The results of new studies of the ethnic composition of the population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly the examination of possible borders, evoked stormy reactions from the Zagreb press at the time.

[Andjelkovic] Back at the beginning of this year, you said that the Serbs in Croatia are the most urgent ethnopolitical and political issue in Europe and that new internal borders are needed, because a majority of the Croats, and especially their right-wing and clerical leadership, do not want Serbs in their community. The months which have passed have confirmed your views many times over. How are the borders of the Serbian nationality in Croatia to be established?

[Ilic] Nowhere in Europe, nor even in the world, is there an area the size of Yugoslavia with such great ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. When we add to that Yugoslavia's particular geostrategic position as central and West Europe's link with the Near East and eastern Mediterranean, then it is clear that Yugoslavia has always attracted the attention of the great powers and its neighbors. It would be better for everyone in Yugoslavia to preserve it as a democratic and federal community in which all citizens would be free and equal, and their nationalities could also develop and gain strength without hindrance. Unfortunately, it is clear today that that kind of Yugoslavia is impossible within the present borders, because the Slovenes and Croats do not want to live in it, which they have in fact confirmed in referendums. Which means, we must undertake demarcation.

Slovenia has a high degree of ethnic homogeneity within its present borders. According to the results of the 1981 Census, 90.5 percent of the inhabitants were Slovenes, and all of 97.7 percent of the Slovenes in Yugoslavia were living in their own republic. That undoubtedly makes it easier to deal with their desire for secession.

However, the situation in Croatia is much more complicated.... In 1981, 75.1 percent of the total population of

Croatia were Croats, and 11.5 percent were Serbs. However, when the distribution of the Serbs is viewed settlement by settlement, then about 23 percent of the territory of Croatia is occupied by 1,007 settlements in which Serbs constitute an absolute majority. When the number of declared Yugoslavs is taken into account, because in Croatia they are mostly Serbs (for well-known reasons, it is easier to be a declared Yugoslav in Croatia than a Serb), then the percentage of territory occupied by the Serbian settlements increases to more than 25 percent.

Following World War II, the mass movement, and particularly the current events, life together in the future is impossible, and it is best for both the Croats and the Serbs to part ways peacefully and draw borders wherever possible, above all on the ethnic principle.

[Andjelkovic] Where should the borders of the Serbian areas be drawn in central and southern Croatia? To what extent do they coincide with the present SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina?

[Ilic] Those borders coincide to a large extent, especially if the Krajina is understood to include settlements in which Serbs are in the majority. That is, not only the territories of those 11 opstinas in which the Serbs are in a majority, but also neighboring Serb settlements in surrounding opstinas (Sibenik, Drnis, and others). If the borders are drawn at the level of settlements, not opstinas, then it can be done rather well. There is a contiguous territory from the vicinity of Zadar and Beograd na Moru, through Kninska Krajina, Lika, Banija, and Kordun to the Sava River in which the Serbs are in the majority and in many settlements represent as much as 90 percent of the population.

Except that we have a Croatian enclave of several settlements around Slunj, in the border zone between Lika and Kordun. The Croats can freely remain there, because both the Serbian people and SAO Krajina have proclaimed their democratic orientation. They are guaranteed all civil rights and other rights which the Serbs have. Certain resettlements of population might also be possible if that would guarantee a more stable peace in the future. That would be an additional effort by agreement that would ensure peace for several generations.

There remains the problem of the Serbs scattered throughout Croatia and in the large cities. It would also be necessary to obtain for those Serbs at least those rights which the Croats have in the Serbian areas and in Serbia.

[Andjelkovic] What solutions do you see for the Serbs in Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem? Where should the border be drawn there?

[Ilic] Because the present Croatian government is pro-Ustasha and has been dealing mercilessly with the Serbian people, especially in the crisis areas along the fringe, I feel that it would be fair to annex to Serbia a quite considerable portion of eastern Slavonia and to resettle Serbs from the crisis areas and western Slavonia who want to be citizens of a third Yugoslavia. Vinkovci,

Vukovar, and Osijek would be the important urban centers in that part of Slavonia, and even the urban Serbs in Zagreb, Rijeka, and other Croatian cities would have somewhere to which to move, because it would not be advisable to accommodate them in rural areas nor in cities in Serbia.

The problem of the Serbs in western Slavonia is the most difficult one. This is a contiguous zone of settlements, beginning with the Sava and Okucani, by way of Daruvar and Pakrac, almost to the Drava River. That sizable oasis of the Serbian people has existed since the 17th and 18th centuries, since the time of the Vojna Krajina [Military Region] and up to the present day, and those Serbs have been the most isolated and cut off.

In eastern Slavonia, on the other hand, we have an oasis of the Croatian people in Osijek, Djakovo, and that vicinity. A solution might be sought by resettling those Serbs and Croats, those, of course, who want to do that. However, then the portion of eastern Slavonia that remained within a Third Yugoslavia would have to be considerably larger and encompass the opstinas Slavonski Brod, Djakovo, Donji Miholjac, Valpovo, Nasice, and everything east of that line. The Serbs from western Slavonia, from Croatian cities, and the scattered Serbs, all those who wish to, would resettle into that area, except for the Serbs in SAO Krajina, which would remain as a Serb entity. The resettlement would be carried out on the principle of exchanging house for house, apartment for apartment, field for field. Serbs from the villages recently burned who have nowhere to which to return should be resettled there even now. For example, resettle the Serbs from Brlog, Divoselo, and other places to Tovarnik.

Aside from resettlement, a solution might also be found by granting the status of condominium to western Slavonia. Condominium is a status of joint and equal administration of a territory by two or more states. Berlin was under some kind of condominium, and then the New Hebrides, Sudan.... That means that Croatia and a Third Yugoslavia, or Serbia, would jointly administer that territory.

A third possible solution, which ought not to be accepted, is resettlement of Serbs into the present Serbia. That would mean the loss of all Serb territories in Croatia except SAO Krajina, and they must not be lost.

There is also the proposal of what is called the maximum line (some people call it Seselj's line): Karlobag, Ogulin, Karlovac, and Virovitica as the border of a Third Yugoslavia. Its significant defect lies in the fact that then more than two million Croats would remain in the Third Yugoslavia, which again would cause new tensions and conflicts.

[Andjelkovic] You have previously advocated that Kninska Krajina and Banija be territorially linked to Bosanska Krajina. What do you think today?

[Ilic] At the beginning of the year, when I proposed that, I still believed that Croatia would nevertheless be a democratic state of equal citizens. However, that is not the case. I think that one of the solutions being offered by SAO Krajina should be adopted. The first is that SAO Krajina be a separate federal unit within a new Yugoslavia. The second is that such a federal unit bring together the territories of the present SAO Krajina and Bosanska Krajina, but official Bosnia-Herzegovina does not agree with that solution.

[Andjelkovic] How are we to see that the new borders do not reward Ustasha genocide, people being forced to move out under pressure, and forcible colonization and do not take away the meaning from the approximately two million Serbs who died for freedom and unification in this century?

[Ilic] Unfortunately, a considerable portion of that territory has been lost, especially on the peripheral areas of Serbian regions. I think there will be very little possibility of getting that back, because others have settled those areas, and the Serbs who survived left them after the war. We must accept that as a part of history which we must not forget.

The example of Baranja is illustrative: In 1931, it had a population of 52,846—21,737, or 41 percent, Serbs and Croats, or Sokci, who were recorded in the census as a single ethnic group. The Germans represented 30 percent and the Hungarians 26 percent. Of those Serbs and Croats, 11,314 were of the Orthodox faith, that is, Serbs, which represents 21 percent, while the Croats or Sokci represented 20 percent. In the 1981 Census, about 26 percent of the population of Baranja was Serb and about 41 percent Croat.

What has happened? The other day they found decisions of the Croatian Assembly and Croatian Central Committee dating from 1945, from among the first decisions after the war, stating that only Croats could colonize Baranja. Instead of Germans and some Hungarians, Croats were moved in, mostly from western Herzegovina. Before that, in the time of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia], so-called "angry" Croats were moved into villages in western Srem that had been burned, and they are now the main Ustasha warriors in that area. Most of them were resettled from Herzegovina.

[Andjelkovic] You also have your own opinion concerning eastern Herzegovina and its linkage to Montenegro. What is happening there now with Bosnia and Herzegovina, are its status and borders changing?

[Ilic] If the Muslim nationality wishes the best, above all for itself, then it must be in favor of a Third Yugoslavia. That would be the most favorable solution for them, because then, except for the Muslims in Zagreb and scattered elsewhere, all the rest would be included in one state, a democratic and federal state, whose members would be Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and possibly Macedonia. Perhaps it would be good to exclude

from that state western Herzegovina, which is inhabited by Croats, indeed the most militant Croats.

If the Muslims should have other demands, possibly the creation of a Muslim state, then eastern Herzegovina ought to be annexed to Montenegro, because this is the same population and has the same tradition. That is represented by six opstinas: Trebinje, Ljubinje, Bileca, Nevesinje, Gacko, and Kalinovik, in which the Serbian nationality is in the majority. In that case, it would be possible to form a Bosnian-Muslim republic which also would be a part of a Third Yugoslavia. It would get the valley of the Neretva with the port of Ploce as an outlet to the sea and the territory around Sarajevo to the Sava, and on the western side to Bosanska Krajina.

To some extent, the Muslims are the key to a Third Yugoslavia, and that accounts for their tactical maneuvering now. For the present, they are more inclined to the Croats, probably for historical reasons, and that is something of which Pavelic made good use in his time.

[Andjelkovic] In Bosanska Krajina and central Bosnia, there are isolated regions with a majority Muslim or majority Serb population. How is that to be worked out?

[Ilic] The principle of democratic regionalization, which is being proposed by the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, should be applied. In the four opstinas of Bosanska Krajina, Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa, the Serbs have suffered a great deal, and then they also moved out. The birth rate of the Serbs is far below that of the Muslims, so that now the Muslims are in the great majority in those opstinas, surrounded by Serb opstinas. The Serbian opstinas above Sarajevo, on Romanija, are in a similar situation. If those regions were a part of a democratic and federal Yugoslavia, if democratic regionalization were carried out as a modern principle of mutual linkage, both here in Serbia and throughout a Third Yugoslavia, there should be no major problems.

The state should renounce regulation of relations that can be regulated by lower-level communities. It would be possible to resolve in a similar way the problem of the 10 opstinas of the Sanjak in which a large number of Muslims live. They are mainly of Serb origin. Many of them can actually trace their Serbian ancestors. With respect to Muslims and Catholics, sometimes mistakes were made by the Serbian Orthodox Church when it took the view that when a Serb changed his faith, he also changed his nationality, which is not so. We must not lose the link between Serbia and Montenegro, which runs across the Sanjak.

[Andjelkovic] Dubrovnik was an internationally recognized state up until 1808, and only in 1939 did it become part of Croatia. In 1945, there were well-documented demands that it be at least an autonomous province. Is it not time to correct that historical injustice?

[Ilic] Dubrovnik ought to have separate autonomy within a Third Yugoslavia or be a separate federal unit,

because it has a lengthy historical tradition as an independent state and its Catholic population is largely of Serb origin. Only in 1939 did it become a part of the Banovina of Croatia and in 1945 part of the Republic of Croatia. A second possible solution for Dubrovnik is possibly a Yugoslav-Croat condominium, but by no means solely Croat.

[Andjelkovic] A century ago, Vuk Karadzic wrote about Serbs "of all three laws," i.e., faiths. In 1910, the pope addressed "the Serb-Catholics of Dubrovnik." Are there still Serbs who are Catholics?

[Ilic] That is difficult to ascertain now, because in the postwar censuses religion was not recorded. By contrast with the Germans, for example, who are both Catholics and Protestants, but still Germans, and then the Swiss, the Americans, and others, where you have a great diversity of religions and languages, but it is only in our case, somewhere in the mid-19th century, that religion became the principal criterion for determination of nationality. Only now are the Serb-Muslims emerging once again and establishing their own association. Earlier, particularly in Dubrovnik, there were prestigious families of Serb-Catholics. Even here in Belgrade we have had Serb-Catholics, even among members of the academy.

In my native village of Padene, 14 km from Knin, before the war I was taught religion by Antonije Pincetic, an Orthodox priest born on Vis, who lives today in Arendjelovac. His family and several dozen others returned to the faith of their fathers—Orthodoxy—in 1926 and 1927. Up to that time, they had declared themselves to be Serb-Catholics. On Vis, they built an Orthodox church at that time, and it was demolished after the war.

[Andjelkovic] The Serbian ethnic space has also been diminished by monkey business in the census. Certain settlements were "added" to larger Croatian ones and thus became Croatian on the principle of a procentual majority. How do you demarcate territory on which the plebiscite will be organized and the principle of self-determination of the population applied?

[Ilic] The demarcation and the territory for the plebiscite should be determined on the basis of the principle of the ethnic majority. Here it is possible to use figures from the population census, but at the level of settlements, not opstinas, with care taken that the areas in which the plebiscites are organized are well rounded. One must always be mindful of the interests of the other side.

[Andjelkovic] Serbs outside Serbia are a valuable part of the Serbian national body. How do you guarantee full linkage of the Serbian people in all regions of a possible Third Yugoslavia?

[Ilic] If the borders of a Third Yugoslavia are drawn so as to include most of the areas in which the Serbs live, there will be no problems linking them together. They must, of course, be left the possibility of regional development,

autonomy, and development of local peculiarities. They are, of course, Serbs, but certain differences do exist, and they should not be smothered.

Aside from that, I think it is very important to continue to develop and strengthen cooperation with the Muslims, because they are an essential part of a possible Third Yugoslavia, they are historically close to the Serbs, and they are so bound up with one another and oriented toward one another for many reasons which have already been mentioned.

Peterle's Party Leads in Election Polls

92BA0105B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 2 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by J.T.: "If the Elections Were Tomorrow, Peterle's Slovene Christian Democrats Would Win"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 1 Nov—The poll on this occasion, which DELO prepared together with its agency STIK, tried to seek the most genuine possible answers to the questions posed, among which the central one was which party those polled would vote for if the elections were on Sunday.

Each pollster had in his hands a sheet of cardboard (19 centimeters in diameter), on which the photographs of 11 leaders were along the outer edge, and the names of the 11 parties were given next to them. It should be added that the poll was conducted the day after the presentation on television of two new parties, Rupel's Democratic one and Pirnat's Populist one, which emerged after the schism in the former SDZ [Slovene Democratic Alliance]. It was thus also after the day when the last JA [Yugoslav Army] soldier left Slovene territory, something with which the name of Defense Minister Janez Jansa, who is also one of the adherents of Rupel's new party of democrats, is associated. The poll, in contrast to previous ones (not just STIK's), thus confirms that people identify parties with the party leaders, since this time the proportion of people who were undecided was very modest; scarcely 70 of 1,055 people polled answered that they did not know which party they would vote for; only two more than those 70 would not take part in the elections; and only nine of those polled would choose a party that was not named. They decided on Drnovsek (two), Jelencic's party (two), the Democratic Party of Retirees, the shadow government, Kramberger, the Central People's Party, etc., each chosen by one respondent.

In any case, the poll also provides an answer to the question of how the undecided would not vote. Among those 70 respondents, the majority, 30, answered that they would not vote for Pucnik's Social Democrats under any circumstances; 11 of them were firmly against Peterle's Christian Democrats; and then these opponents were followed by Skolc's Liberal Democrats (nine),

Ribicic's Reformers (eight), Pirnat's National Democrats (four), Zakelj's Socialists (three), and Rupel's Democrats and Oman's Peasants (one); and no one expressed an opinion on Plut's Greens and Mocnik's Social-Democratic Union [SDU].

We asked those polled three more questions. The first was whether they had a telephone at home. An affirmative answer was given by 652, a negative one by 396, and the remaining seven respondents did not answer.

Next, we were interested in which newspaper they read. Most of them, 346, read DELO, 215 read DNEVNIK, 160 read VECER, 81 read SLOVENSKE NOVICE, and 17 read SLOVENEK; the remaining 13 read other newspapers, mostly NEDELJSKI DNEVNIK (58), PRIMORSKE NOVICE (17), GORENJSKI GLAS and NOVI TEDNIK (nine each), etc. There were 105 respondents who answered that they did not read any.

Finally, we asked the respondents, as infrequent or frequent readers of a given newspaper, which party they would vote for. DELO's readers put Rupel's (new) Democratic Party in first place, and immediately after it, Ribicic's Reformers, Skolc's Liberal Democrats, and Peterle's Christian Democrats; at the bottom of the scale they ranked (from the bottom up) Golja's Liberals, Mocnik's SDU, and Pirnat's SDZ-NDS [Slovene Democratic Alliance-National Democratic Party], Oman's Peasants, etc. DNEVNIK's readers would give priority to the same four parties, but the ones at the bottom of the list would be Mocnik's SDU and Golja's LS [Liberal Party], followed by Pirnat's SDZ-NDS and Pucnik's SDSS [Social Democratic Party of Slovenia]. VECER's readers would put Peterle's Christian Democrats, Skolc's Liberal Democrats, Ribicic's Reformers, and Rupel's Democrats in first place. The ones at the bottom of the list would be, first of all, Mocnik and Golja with their parties, and then Pirnat's SDZ-NDS and Zakelj's Socialists. The readers of SLOVENSKE NOVICE would rank in first place Peterle's Christian Democrats, Plut's Greens, Skolc's LDS [Liberal Democratic Party], Oman's Peasants, and Ribicic's Reformers, and at the bottom, without any possibility for votes, they would put four parties: Mocnik's, Oman's, Golja's, and Zakelj's. SLOVENEK's readers would vote as follows: Peterle's Christian Democrats, Plut's Greens, and Oman's Peasants. Mocnik's SDU, Pirnat's SDZ-NDS, Golja's LS, Skolc's LDS, and Zakelj's SSS [Socialist Party of Slovenia] would not receive a single vote.

Increased Problems With Lawlessness in Croatia

92BA0103B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
22 Oct 91 pp 24-25

[Article by Srdjan Spanovic: "How To Stop the Lawlessness"]

[Text] In the past 10 days, the man most in demand with journalists has certainly been Ivan Cermak, one of the more significant activists of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and the key person in recent months

in the acquisition of arms for the Croatian Army. The search for him began after there were rumors about alleged illegal taxes on purchases of arms and about holding back production of weapons in Croatia itself, and it intensified when Damir Mejovsek, a deputy, issued a charge from the speaker's platform that Mr. Cermak had hindered the purchase of 200 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

Ivan Cermak seems to have disappeared from the face of the earth. We were told at the entrance to Banski Dvori that he has not been working there for the last week or two, and an attempt through the city committee of the HDZ also failed, because he does not go there either, nor do they know his telephone number. And when we looked for the number in the directory, we learned that this is now the number of one of his enterprises.

Then we went to his office, where his secretary cordially assured us that she had not seen Ivan Cermak in more six months. In the meantime, we were hearing new rumors about an alleged disappearance of Mr. Cermak, and then on Friday we learned that he was coming to a meeting in the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia. Nor on that occasion did we see or hear him.

From the Ban to Dinamo

Ivan Cermak is not a person who was unknown in the public and political life of Zagreb and Croatia, and he probably has good reason for avoiding newsmen. Especially when it was our intention to give an opportunity to present his view of the problems and to answer the accusations and imputations, which have been made both publicly and also behind the scenes. As one of the most successful private businessmen in Zagreb and then also the owner of enterprises, Cermak has always been better known as a businessman aside from his political activity. It was his Forum that handled all the business of restoring the monument to Ban Josip Jelacic, jointly with the enterprise Rez and its owner Tadija Barbaric. After that, the public was agitated by Zagreb Mayor Boris Buzancic, who raised the issue of the amount collected for work on the monument, saying that hundreds of thousands of marks were for all practical purposes stolen. Rival bidders for the work on the monument who did not get the contract joined in the accusations, but the war in Croatia silenced the whole affair.

Cermak's name has also been mentioned on the list of potential, but very serious, candidates for taking over Zagreb's soccer team Dinamo, known today as HASK [Croatian Amateur Boxing Club] Gradjanski. Finally, nothing has so far come of that deal, which does not mean that Cermak has decided not to purchase Zagreb's most popular soccer team. That is, according to those who are better informed about the entire transaction and the intentions of the bidders, the deal was based not only on the team, but also the stadium, which up to now has only been swallowing up money to maintain it when it is standing idle.

It is clear from all this that it would not pay anyone to write off Ivan Cermak, because he is an able businessman, nor to judge him without firm proof. Which is what makes his dodging reporters still stranger (we know that other newspaper offices have also been looking for him). And we ought to be hearing from parliamentary bodies and investigating agencies, because the accusations against the extremely important offices which he holds, leaving aside the rumors in the corridors, were uttered in a session of the state's supreme body.

We have learned from a source close to the Assembly that the departure of General Martin Spegelj is somehow related to the irregularities and personal interests of individuals in the purchasing of arms. That is, it is said that Gen. Spegelj's proposal for attacks on certain garrisons and also for negotiations with certain commanders to surrender the garrisons, was rejected precisely because Croatian forces would not have been supplied arms at the expense of the enemy, but would have continued to be imported, with individuals collecting large commissions.

The capture of several garrisons at a time when the federal army did not even dream it was in danger of that or the passage of several commanders over to the Croatian side [original reads "strength"] would have furnished sizable quantities of the most diverse armament. We should not forget that in the meantime weapons and equipment have been withdrawn from many garrisons, so that they have become less valuable as war prizes, and the ammunition dumps that have been destroyed in Bjelovar, Ostarije, and near Rijeka show that the enemy will do anything to minimize the arms and military equipment reaching the Croatian Army.

As to the arms which individuals have obtained in the capture or surrender of the garrisons and the investigations or indictments that have been filed in such cases, we asked for information from the Zagreb District Public Prosecutor's Office.

Irreplaceable Policemen

Anto Nobilo, deputy district public prosecutor, told us that recently, especially since the taking of the garrisons, there have been a large number of cases of unlawful sales of arms of the most diverse kinds.

"We do not recall such a rise of crimes committed with firearms as recently, because in conflicts in which people once would have resorted to their fists and clubs, they are now fighting with kalashnikovs. On one occasion, for example, during an air raid in Zagreb, a person we found who had been accused in some dispute was carrying two hand grenades. I demanded that the police be called, because that is a crime, even though this individual said that he had obtained the hand grenades in the local community headquarters," Anto Nobilo said.

The charges against individuals and groups smuggling arms have also become more frequent since the garrisons were taken. Under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, penalties of not less than three months and as

long as 10 years in prison are foreseen for the possession of prohibited explosives and arms and for their sale.

Anto Nobilo confirmed that there have been a fair number of crimes committed by members of the police reserves and the Guards.

"These are the cases in which charges have been filed. This does not mean that we have information on everything that has happened, because I do not believe that charges have been filed in all such cases. However, we should remember that until recently there was no military police in the Croatian Armed Forces. It has now been formed, and already it has carried out several successful operations, but a shortage of conventional police is being felt in the cities.

"While watching a recent television report from Sunja, I saw in the front ranks of the fighters people from the Section for Narcotics and Prohibited Trade of the Zagreb Police Department. They can be replaced on the front by members of the Guards, but in Zagreb their knowledge is irreplaceable. Without them, our city could become an El Dorado for drug smugglers," Anto Nobilo recounted. To illustrate that he has no intention to cover up anything or look the other way for anybody, Nobilo mentioned the investigation being conducted against four policemen who murdered Ante Paradzik, leader of the Croatian Rights Party [HSP].

Nowhere in the world is it customary, not even in wartime, for soldiers in their free time, when they are not involved in military operations, to walk city streets, to ride streetcars, and to go into cafes with long-barreled weapons. It is an exception when they move in organized columns.

The custom is for such weapons of soldiers to be kept in garrisons or at the front. That is also probably a reason why the authorities in Rijeka and Zadar passed a ban on movement in the city with such weapons, and Zlatko Kramaric, mayor of Osijek, has announced a ban on serving alcohol to Guard members, as well as stiff penalties for all those who wage dirty war and provoke reactions from the enemy.

The Case of Aksentijevic

In the large cities, looting and burglary of apartments have become widespread. This is usually done in uniform, and unfortunately the perpetrators include both members of the Guards and members of the police reserves. Such actions, in devastated Karlovac particularly, have led the local authorities to seek the establishment of a military tribunal. However, according to what we have learned, this is sternly opposed by Bosiljko Misetic, minister of administration and jurisprudence, and Zeljko Olujic, republic public prosecutor, who had been insisting that the institutions of the state must take up all such cases, and by no means summary, parallel, or gimcrack institutions, which the judicial system in Croatia has been fighting for the last year.

We also asked Mr. Nobile about war crimes, a topic that has exceptional relevance for the public.

"The police first have to collect data on all such cases. At this moment, I know only of an investigation in Djakovo against a sizable number of officers of the JA [Yugoslav Army] precisely because of a war crime. War crimes are very clearly defined in the international law of war; however, officers of the JA count on extricating themselves. They are convinced of their victory and think that as victors they will be the ones to render judgment. In case of defeat, they count on hiding in Serbia.

"However, they are much in error if they believe that the present regime in Serbia will last forever, that democracy cannot triumph and bring them before a court or extradite them to Croatia. Powerful people have ended up before the court in Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany.... After the war in Vietnam, the Americans also tried their own officers because of a war crime in the village My Lai. Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have a clear position on this: Violations of the international law of war must go before the courts," Nobile said.

Nobile's answer to the question of whether there have been charges filed for violation of the international law of war by Croatian soldiers and units was that there have been no charges, but Croatia cannot tolerate possible crimes of its own fighters, and anyone who decides to take such a step must know that he will be accountable regardless of his war record or position.

We also asked him about the status of the imprisoned Gen. Milan Aksentijevic. Anto Nobile said that no charge of war crimes had been filed against Gen. Aksentijevic in the District Public Prosecutor's Office in Zagreb, which does not preclude the jurisdiction of some other prosecutor's office, but he has no information on that. He believes that at this moment Gen. Aksentijevic is a prisoner of war.

The aggression against Croatia and entry into the war have obviously raised a number of problems to which thought was not given at first. This, of course, does not mean that they can wait for the end of the war, because many of these problems could even influence its final outcome....

Croatian Policy, Constitution Criticized

92BA0103C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
22 Oct 91 pp 26-28

[Interview with Marko Veselica, president of the Croatian Democratic Party, by Zeljko Ivankovic; place and date not given: "Croatia Is Not Up for Sale"]

[Text] The establishment of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], an event which was anticipated on the rise of pluralism with a curiosity that corresponded to the lengthy and thorough preparations, seemed at first like a complete failure. Not only because everything

occurred "out of the public eye," but because the party that was most radically Croatian on the basis of its names split up at the very outset. Marko Veselica parted from Franjo Tudjman and established the Croatian Democratic Party [HDS]. It seemed at that point that someone had pulled a fast one, that UDBA [State Security Administration], KOS [Counterintelligence Service], or similar forces had actually seized an opportunity for which they had been waiting and destroyed their most dangerous opponent. But immediately before the election or just after it there were already interpretations that the group that had prepared establishment of the HDZ had itself arranged the split so that Franjo Tudjman would be enthroned in the center, while the Veselicas are his artificially created right wing. Especially when it came out in public that at the outset Marko refrained from a battle with Tudjman over the post of leader in the HDZ, because "the time for him had still not come."

Today, a year and a half after the election, none of the prior speculations seem to hold water. Marko Veselica obviously does not think that his time has not yet come, but is operating at top speed, as though his time is arriving. One of the most vigorous critics of President Tudjman's policy—although from what might be called positions further to the right. Not only because the interview was done before Tudjman's recent negotiating success in the Hague, or, better put, the complete debacle of the Serbian policy, which is finally an object of reproach for the entire world, but also because he was nevertheless trying to predict the course of events, Marko Veselica criticizes the president of Croatia rather abstractly, basing his criticism on a fundamental advocacy of Croatian statehood, refusing to recognize any possibility of political bargaining, so that it sometimes seems that he does not consent to any possible compromises. Yet they are the bread and butter of politics. Yet on the other side, Veselica differs from Paraga, say, even more than Tudjman does. Comparisons with others on the Croatian political scene would seem to amount to nothing more than massaging the brain. The Croatian Democratic Party has obviously created its own image in spite of the almost inevitable boycott in the media. Or it is the boycott that has made them obstinate. It would be pointless to forecast what the political results of that obstinacy will be.

[Ivankovic] Why did the Croatian Democratic Party recently announce withdrawal of its members from the Democratic Unity government?

[Veselica] We were the last to put our signature on formation of the new government in the closing moments of the session of the Assembly on 3 August, because we were dissatisfied with the way the system of parliamentary democracy had been functioning up to that point, especially with the relation between the president of the republic and the government. We feel that that model has not been playing its role, it has not been mobilizing all the forces which Croatia possesses. It is our intention that the role of the president of the republic be reduced to normal limits, because his having

this kind of position is resulting in major defeats and is weakening democracy, thereby blocking Croatia from advancing in the world a joint strategy with peoples and republics which have also been victims of Serbian genocidal aggression. I am referring to the Muslims, the Albanians, the Montenegrins, and even the Macedonians, the Hungarians in Vojvodina, and to some extent even the Slovenes. It is simply amazing how bad the Croatian government has been operating, how much anarchy there is, how much disorder, inefficiency, how many attempts to privatize that authority and put it at the service of one group of people.... Accordingly, we want a change in the technology, a sharing out of the responsibility, we want criteria to be found for formation of the government and for staffing the ministries, and we want guarantees that the media will be free. That is also the way we look on the negotiations which the president is conducting with the military junta of generals, whom we consider war criminals, as indeed we do Slobodan Milosevic. The manner in which they are being conducted, the failure to consult the Croatian parties, the Assembly, and the government, attract suspicion to that policy. If things are not corrected, then, we have announced our departure from the government. We do not need unity in the sense of iconography, but as an organic set of instruments for democratic integration of all Croatian forces in the fight for survival.

[Ivankovic] Do you really think you should leave the government?

[Veselica] We know that we are all responsible, although the president is the most responsible. Responsibility is also born by the Croatian Assembly, which in its last session did not conduct an analysis of the defense policy. Baranja, after all, fell without a fight. In Beli Manastir, there were 20 rifles. The people did not prepare themselves for defense at all. All the successes have been a matter of local initiatives, which are necessary, but they are not sufficient in a conflict with an aggressive and criminal army.

[Ivankovic] In mentioning the privatization of power, you are mainly attacking the president. But most of his activity is public. Can you state specifically, then, or do you have information and indications, that there has been privatization of power at certain other levels?

[Veselica] I think that the entire mechanism has failed to be developed. It is clear that democracy and a democratic culture cannot be established after 45 years of captivity by the Serbs and Communists. We did not expect a miracle. But democracy is not euphoria, and the HDZ emerged as a movement that rose up on the basis of the communist election law. That was how it was able to win the elections with manipulative technology, propaganda, and the personality cult. There were illusions that all of that together would nevertheless get by, that democracy would develop later, and we have all had to pay a high price for that. It is on that logic that the antidemocratic and antiparliamentary constitution was built. Although the Slovenian position is a great deal

easier, their model has proved to be more productive. But precisely because they do not have the syndrome of Serbian expansionism and the fifth column, the cancer in the organism of Croatian space, Croatia must be still more lucid. We entered the elections in order to alter the character of government power and in order to prevent it from becoming the instrument of one group of people, one party, or one individual as the basis for forming a power pyramid. Vagueness is a bolshevist principle. Aside from the paragovernmental bodies already mentioned, which are unnecessary, it is not clear what the crisis command centers are for if there is a government. Why are parallel structures created which could cause chaos?

[Ivankovic] Why have you backed off the promise which you made before the election that you would put the demand of reducing the authority of the president?

[Veselica] We have not backed off. It was a coincidence that Banski Dvori was attacked first. That made it possible to hold consultations with the deputy caucus. Racan and the Socialists withdrew from the agreement at the level of the Coordination of Opposition Parties. There has been no withdrawal. That initiative remains in effect. The possibility even existed of the president taking advantage of Article 101 of the Constitution of putting the Assembly on the ice and finding an alibi in the state of war. However, we feel that precisely in this situation the Assembly should be in permanent session. After all, the mistake should be analyzed, and, in spite of the objective circumstances, we feel there have been too many of them. No one is infallible, and everyone who holds public office and who has been elected by the people must be subject to scrutiny. Well, there has been none of that, and there are certain factors that would like to continue to block it.

[Ivankovic] Croatia has become independent. It is now an urgent task to cast the aggressor out of the country and achieve international recognition. Military and political resources are at our disposition. What measure to coordinate them is most appropriate at the present moment?

[Veselica] Croatia has thrown out the set of instruments of the federal state, for which it was an object of occupation, hatred, sadism, exploitation, and humiliation. The war which is now being waged is proof of all that. Democratic Croatia is the opposite of Yugoslavia, which is an instrument of the hegemony of Serbian expansionism. The last Assembly is creating only a minimal constitutional precondition at the internal European and world levels. There is a painful process yet to come which will require a great deal of blood, sweat, denial, and misery, temporary loss of territory, and also a sociopsychological battle for establishment of full Croatian independence, and then communications channels need to be set up for relations with other states and with Europe. And it is clear that the question of when to do this, by what act it is to be done, by what methods and means it will be done, are a question of policy, a question

of the appropriate promotional instruments. There is also a need for maturity so that the framework of formal law and declarations take on their real strength. So that Croatia can demonstrate to Europe and the world what it possesses, to make evident what it can give the world and what the world can give it.

[Ivankovic] When you speak about Europe, there are two follow-up questions. Croatia has been insisting on internationalization of the crisis, and when this has not sufficiently helped for the moment, at least it has not met expectations, a kind of anti-Europeanism has been developing. How is that to be overcome? Also, there have been marked efforts for Croatian sovereignty in the public, and Delors says of the European integrations themselves that they have in fact come about because the states have given up a portion of their sovereignty.

[Veselica] I think that the fight for Croatian sovereignty and inclusion in the processes of European integration are complementary things. Modern Europe was created on the basis of recognition of sovereignty as an expression of each nationality's identity. The state is the form within whose framework that identity can be expressed and organized as a real category. The Marxist conception of abstract internationalism actually signifies erasure of differences. Europe will integrate on those factors on which all can profit. It is clear that there are many illusions about Europe. For many generations of Croats who fled, the West was an ideal. And now it is showing a bit of indolence, at least that is how it seems to us, because it is not that idealistic paradise. There has been quite a bit of deception, because President Tudjman's policy has created too many illusions and fictions, as though everything had been settled. It all began with a great number of rituals, folklore, small celebrations, and they neglected the real intentions of the enemy and the real difficulties of the Croatian policy.

[Ivankovic] Now that we are talking about this, the SDP [Democratic Reform Party] was the only one of the opposition parties that was issuing warnings about this in its time, rather cautiously, timidly, bureaucratically, and covertly, but doing so nevertheless.

[Veselica] The SDP has made other mistakes. But it has been warning that there are real determinations, because the SDP has a different memory. Racan himself, who emerged from a maw of Serbian expansionist policy, has helped the opposition processes to occur. But we cannot forget his role in '71, we cannot get around that. Aside from that, we see that the SDP has left immense holes, for example, in Baranja, because it adopted the premise that there would be no conflicts. The SDP received a great many Serbian votes in Grubisno Polje, and almost all those Serbs joined up with the Chetniks. And the SDP has always underestimated the nationality question, underestimated the Croatian movement, and it is responsible for terribly many things. Yet it must be given credit for having been critical of the euphoria. Here, the SDP had a memory and a feel for the times, it knew the real strength of the enemy in Belgrade and everything

that was being cooked up in the Army and Serbian expansionist hegemony as a remnant of bolshevism. It knew that this project would not be easy to carry out, because it is very difficult to make real steps in politics and because there are mental and other determinants in policy which are very difficult to break up in the phase of euphoria. The SDP had an opportunity to see better than others who had been amateurs in politics. Likewise, they do not see a number of factors which have been there and which can never be overcome, and that is why there have been upheavals, paralysis, and destruction.

[Ivankovic] According to the news from the Hague, Croatia is ready to regulate separately in some fashion the question of the Serbs in Croatia. How do you look upon that?

[Veselica] That is a profound problem. Croatia must face it, and it is not so easy to resolve. The holder of sovereignty in Croatia is the Croatian people, because it alone deserves credit for Croatia's existence by virtue of its blood, its genes, and its inimitability. Were that not the case, then it would be Serbia, Austria, Italy, Germany.... All others who have come and who represent smaller parts of their own nationality must have completely the same rights, civil and human, economic, and all others. The Serbs in Croatia have the right to sovereignty in their parent state. They can be guaranteed minority rights, cultural rights, written and spoken language, and everything that constitutes culture. It is normal that they should be equal in the exercise of government, in elections, and in all other respects at the political level, but there can be no talk of any communities, krajinas, or regional administrations. We feel that that would insert equality and create new conflicts that would break up the body of Croatia, that appropriate negotiations and solutions have not been conducted or found in that direction in the Hague, and that that entire matter should be reassessed. That must not be influenced by this situation with the war which Serbia is waging and which unfortunately a large portion of the Serbs have taken up. After all, if they are dissatisfied, there are political means and political struggles. Croatia must recognize that they have all the rights that have been achieved in this regard in Europe and which must also be recognized for the Croats in Serbia. Any solution of these problems that is not in keeping with the European charters would not be productive. It is precisely that tendency to always be granting the Serbs in Croatia something, to develop in them a permanent need to seek something more, and then there is no Croatia. But it is also clear that we dare not draw from this situation we are in the idea that they do not have any rights here.

[Ivankovic] It seems an attempt is being made to resolve the issue using the model of local home rule that has been used in certain countries in Europe.

[Veselica] The Serbs do not have that compactness in Croatia, because they are not compact, they are dispersed, there are more of them in the cities than in the krajinas. What is more, they think that Lika is some

krajina of theirs, but neither there nor anywhere else do they have a majority on a compact territory: in Lika, there are 42 percent Serbs and 47 percent Croats. Nor do they have a majority in Baranja, and in Slavonia they represent 18 percent. That means that nowhere do they have the basis for raising that issue. That is also an illusion on the part of President Tudjman if he is going to resolve the issue that way. This is not an issue at that level, but the problem of an imperial pathological claim to destroy Croatia and for a small percentage of Serbs to be the ruler of Croatia. That pathology will never be satisfied with a view that resolves the question of the Serbs in Croatia through bargaining.

[Ivankovic] But there is also the question here of Croats in other parts of what until now has been Yugoslavia and whether you accordingly accept Croatia's present borders?

[Veselica] The borders are bad for Croatia and much worse than for Serbia. They entered this community differently in 1918. In 1910, the Serbs in Vojvodina represented only 25 percent, and now they represent 52 percent. At the same time, that is a reality, and must be accepted. Often a desire for larger borders, as in Serbia, jeopardizes the normal method of regulating relations and of achieving the optimum, because no one can realize his maximum interests. That leads to wars, a test of energy.... I think that the Serbian question, resolving it, must not be so firmly bound up with the question of Croatia's international recognition. Western policy has developed a paranoia over that issue, and Serbian promotion has given it an unfair significance. The negotiating team and President Tudjman have not even come close to deriving advantage for those crimes which Serbia is committing in Serbia itself against the Albanians and also against Hungarians and Croats. It has not managed to impose a universal criterion, but rather Serbia has managed to impose the problem of the Serbs in Croatia.

Croatia should have put more emphasis on the issues of all those who comprise the former Yugoslavia, because Serbian imperial policy has placed all this region's nationalities in jeopardy and danger. Instead of representing the fight for Croatian independence as something that has universal importance for all the nationalities in this region, Croatia has been isolated from other issues and Slobodan Milosevic has been given the advantage of shattering one factor after another, of confronting Croatia with the others. Tudjman is carried away with the illusion that the Croatian issue will be resolved in isolation through direct negotiations. The HDS is therefore taking part in building the League for Democracy, Freedom, and Independence of the Nationalities of the Former Yugoslavia.

[Ivankovic] The Croats in the diaspora certainly represent very important support in resolving the question of the government in the country. You recently had a meeting with them, can you tell us something about that?

[Veselica] The Croatian emigre community is a very important component of Croatia's overall destiny. And accordingly of the policy for creating the Croatian state as well. In that direction, Croat emigres have immense energy in various parts of the world. In the United States, we have 1,000 university professors, yet only 100 or so are involved. There is an important financial potential and also democratic experience and work habits. And some of the Croats, as citizens of democratic countries, could have an important influence in changing the policy of certain states and nations. Thus, a considerable influence is being exerted on Canadian and Australian policy, and 25 percent of the senators in the United States already favor an independent Croatia. There are distinguished Croats who have direct contacts with leading American politicians. There are young Croats who have not forgotten their homeland and who have graduated from various universities....

[Ivankovic] The war is raging irrepressibly. In what combination of military and political activity do you see a solution? It need not be just, because politics is reality, not an ideal.

[Veselica] In the end, we will have to sit down at the negotiating table. Croatia still must have more coordination and solidarity in opposing the horrible destruction. Dubrovnik must not be left to itself, but the principle of all for all should be pursued. And it is the same with Vukovar, Osijek, Pakrac....

[Ivankovic] Because you are an economist, you certainly can have a great deal to say about the economic dimensions of the present situation. There are a great many topics that come to mind here, from the looting of Croatia by primitive and sophisticated methods, which does not mean there is any less theft, to the question of our own currency, a war economy....

[Veselica] The mistakes are immense, our facilities are disintegrating not only because of destruction, but also because of poor government management. For example, why is "Prvomajska" going bankrupt? After the war, it is true, we will rebuild, just as Germany rebuilt, but facilities could be used in a war economy even now, in war production to meet strategic needs. As far as a war economy is concerned, solidarity is terribly important under those circumstances. That is why we should undertake a radical redistribution of earnings. We should take away from those who have been working to destabilize Croatia as soon as possible. Aside from achieving a fair solution in this way, we get a far higher level of motivation.

[Ivankovic] Party life has not died out even in wartime. In fact, it is raging.

[Veselica] There is a tendency to use the war as an alibi for putting an end to democracy, yet only democracy can make it possible to analyze the conditions and make changes. That is why the news that was abroad, and which coordination of the opposition parties must deny, that the parties had agreed to freeze their activities, is an

irresponsible piece of sabotage for which someone should be made accountable. Although we are not satisfied with our treatment in the media, only they make it possible to put the question in public as to why not a single big-time war profiteer has been caught, yet there is so much talk about them? It is one of the very strengths of democracy to raise these issues even in wartime.

Slovene Intelligence Eavesdropped on JA

92BA0105A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
29 Oct 91 pp 2, 3

[Unattributed article: "Dishonor of Yugoslav Army Officers"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Excerpts] Section 9 of the Slovene Defense Ministry recorded numerous interesting conversations among members of the Yugoslav Army before and during the withdrawal from Slovenia

Ljubljana, 28 Oct—The Slovene Defense Ministry's intelligence service, better known under the name of "Section 9," certainly played one of the more important roles during the war for Slovenia. The intelligence information that it collected recently as well also helped in having the JA [Yugoslav Army] withdrawal from Slovenia proceed without major upheavals. The Slovene side was thus kept promptly informed the whole time about the Army's intentions, and that is why it was able to prevent all sorts of things in time and essentially, win a victory in the negotiations with the Army leadership.

Now, recordings of conversations among high Army officials are also available to the public. One can learn all sorts of instructive things from them, and especially about what a comprehensive defeat the JA suffered on the territory of Slovenia. In this regard, of course, thanks are also due to Slovene Territorial Defense's intelligence officers who succeeded in breaking into the JA's system of enciphered communications during the war, and thus in obtaining all sorts of decisive and crucial information. The recorded conversations that are available to the public also indicate the kind of enemy we had to deal with—it is now quite clear that these are high Army officers whose moral fiber is not exactly their best side in life and who are prepared to turn even defeat into profit and personal benefit in order to achieve their idiotic goals.

Just a short while ago, General Andrija Raseta, the deputy commander of the 5th Army Region, was claiming that Slovene intelligence officers were collecting information by eavesdropping on officers through the public telephone network, as a result of which the Army was forced to prepare special military communications, protected by ciphers, for its strictly confidential conversations. Even this, however, did not save the Army from the vigilant ears of the intelligence officers of the Slovene Defense Ministry.

We can conclude from the daily report on 23 September 1991, when General Jovan Pavlov, the commander of

the Ljubljana 4th Corps, and an unidentified general from Belgrade were talking, that the JA's members in Slovenia were at the end of their rope, that Jansa had again mobilized part of the Territorial Defense, and that pressures and provocations aimed at JA members could be felt everywhere. Among other things, Pavlov said that the soldiers and officers could not hold out much longer shut up in the barracks that way. They had been most affected by the mass departure (surrender) of high-ranking officers, and for that reason they were wondering what they were even still doing in Slovenia.

When Pavlov was talking with General Raseta about the Army's final departure from Slovenia, the latter said that they had been convinced that "affairs" in Croatia would be settled in a few days, but now everything was being dragged out a great deal, and the Army was left without food and weapons. It was obvious that the bosses in Belgrade had not learned anything, Raseta commented.

On 24 September, General Uzelac spoke with Colonel Ivanovic, an assistant to General Prasecivic.

[Ivanovic] Did you hear that all of Varazdin surrendered?

[Uzelac] No.

[Ivanovic] Yes, they all surrendered, including Popov (a notorious bloodthirsty colonel who devastated Gornja Radgona during the war in Slovenia). They took them to Serbia by bus, and now they are all in Belgrade. That was the agreement. Now they (the Croatian army—author's comment) are dragging out the tanks and all the equipment. You know how much there was. If by some chance they use those tanks, I will propose that we destroy Zagreb, those beasts. I would throw napalm on the tanks and burn them all up.

We find out from a conversation between Uzelac and Prasecivic on the same day that the Federal Secretary for National Defense, Veljko Kadijevic, was not in the best of health.

[Uzelac] Did you hear that Veljko had two heart attacks?

[Prasecivic] Yes. He is in the hospital now.

[Uzelac] Good. Let us hope that everything will be all right.

From a conversation between Raseta and Pavlov on 5 October:

[Pavlov] You saw that chief in Postojna; in five days he deposited 180 billion in his savings account.

[Raseta] Arrest him. Watch out that he does not escape, [expletive omitted]! He should be locked up somewhere here, and we will pick him up when all of this is settled.

It is also apparent from some later conversations what was happening on those days in the barracks in Slovenia. Not only did some officers try to sell privately and on their own behalf everything that they had managed to

capture "in their own backyard," but they also tried to speculate with the military housing fund, since they even managed to rent some of those apartments for foreign exchange to some naive Slovenes.

On 5 October, Raseta and Pavlov also spoke about the various possibilities for the JA's departure from Slovenia.

[Pavlov] Is there a possibility that we could leave from there?

[Raseta] Why not? Across Italy, onto the ships, and one part will go through Hungary—I hope that we will resolve this.

[Pavlov] Yes, that would be best if it worked out. Since we have a lot of everything here, tanks and...

[Raseta] Yes, yes, in principle Hungary has already agreed. Then it will be over in two or three days.

It is also apparent from a conversation between the two officers that all sorts of things were also happening with the military hospital in Ljubljana.

[Raseta] Everything that was written off in the military hospital has to be inspected by Stajcic. It can be sold, but nothing else should be written off. The military hospital is being packed for departure.

[Pavlov] Everything has been packed.

[Raseta] Good, then it will all go at once.

[Pavlov] We would have to know a little ahead of time that we can load it.

[Raseta] So you know, it is certainly going, so those people will not bargain any more. And I do not know who told them and who sent those medics, on whose orders!

[Pavlov] Comrade General, I inquired, and they claim that it was ordered by Milicevic and requested by Cad, that they are his soldiers, and that is why they were packed into some bus and sent down. The Internal Affairs Ministry troops disarmed them all and sent the troops to Cad. Now they would only return the weapons after agreements.

[Raseta] Milicevic is here with me, and he says that he is lying.

[Pavlov] Then Vrancic is lying.

[Raseta] He is lying.

[Pavlov] Well, he is lying, Comrade General. Just yesterday I told you that Vrancic and that guy of mine here—Premuzic—were only demanding things for themselves, for their own interests, and that they would sell the entire state, not just a hospital.

[Raseta] So it is necessary to say that they should gather there and one of you should go to the hospital and gather the patients and say, "Gentlemen, pack up and go."

[Pavlov] I understand; I will look to see whether everything has been packed. They have been ordered not to write off and sell anything.

[Raseta] Only what the commission that was there wrote off and sold. I talked with Sljivic, the Slovenes have not answered anything, and that is how it is going.

[Pavlov] All right.

[Raseta] [expletive omitted]

[Pavlov] They will want us to give them everything as a present, which we should not do.

[Raseta] It is all going.

On 7 October, at 1315 hours, a conversation between Pavlov and Raseta:

[Pavlov] How are things going there?

[Raseta] Well, I am drinking some wine and whiskey.

[Pavlov] Then...that alternative through Trieste is off.

[Raseta] Now we are working with the Republic of Slovenia, since they were being critical about why it was going there and why they hadn't been made an offer, etc.

[Pavlov] Did you hear about their Presidency's proposal?

[Raseta] No, I didn't, what?

[Pavlov] It has to do with some three points. The first is that we have to leave by 18 October, and that not a single soldier should remain on their territory. In the second place, if we do not move out by 18 October, then we will leave through Koper, but without the equipment, since they cannot allow it to be used in the war against Croatia, and later they would settle accounts for it in the balance sheet for distribution.

[Raseta] Listen to what I am telling you. If things are not settled by the 18th, that is, not by the 18th, but by the 15th...gather the troops, you have the money, and buy a ship. With respect to the equipment, disable it, you know how. Let out the oil, turn on the motor, and start it running. And there is no more motor....

A conversation between General Pavlov and Colonel Ivanovic, on 7 October:

[Pavlov] How are things there?

[Ivanovic] We do not see any improvement; we do not know what we will do or how.

[Pavlov] Oh, [expletive omitted]. We don't know anything here either.

[Ivanovic] Well, they said by the 18th. Then they will consider us an occupying army.

[Pavlov] Then they will shoot at us.

[Ivanovic] Well, they probably won't.

[Pavlov] They will, they will.

[Ivanovic] No...I think, I don't know, they will reach an agreement on a withdrawal....

[Pavlov] Well, we will see, [expletive omitted]...

[Ivanovic] If they at least allowed us to pull out the personnel, we would leave the rest; then I could cover everything.

[Pavlov] That is possible; we can set fire to everything.

[Ivanovic] No, no, I am saying, first of all, that we should pull out the personnel. That is what I am thinking of. And then we should cover it with the aircraft, and put an end to it. So that they will remember when the Army was there.

[Pavlov] All right. Good.

A conversation between General Mico Delic and officer Milicevic from Zagreb, at 2214 hours on 8 October:

[Delic] Hello, Brale!

[Milicevic] Hello, Mico.

[Delic] What's new?

[Milicevic] Ha, Andrija!

[Delic] Has he ordered something?

[Milicevic] What should I tell you—the people he talks to are bad. That scum Avasic, that former, and still some sort of brute from Varazdin, who came, some sort of Assistant Defense Minister... (the following portion is incoherent and indistinct—author's note).

[Delic] They captured one of mine here....

[Milicevic] Whom?

[Delic] Well, Katalina, [expletive omitted]. He came to me, then left again, and some little guide....

[Milicevic] Well, where were they, [expletive omitted]?

[Delic] They were going from one barracks to another....

[Milicevic] And they captured them?

[Delic] Yes.

[Milicevic] On what basis?

[Delic] On some...as a war criminal, which I am here, too. I told Prascevic and Raseta, [expletive omitted], there are about 10 people here who should be pulled out.

[Milicevic] [Expletive omitted], did you notify the commander?

[Delic] Of course I notified him....

[Milicevic] Oh, [expletive omitted], watch out, Mico, don't go outside, [expletive omitted].

[Delic] [Expletive omitted], do you know what I am here? No one needs me anymore, and we have been sacrificed here.

[Milicevic] We need you.

[Delic] If anyone needed me, I would have left here along with 90 percent of my corps.

Then the interlocutors focused on the dilemmas regarding the new Slovene money.

[Delic] Now they are introducing some sort of, some sort of "kolar" here for us, [expletive omitted] not a dollar.

[Milicevic] Yes, yes, the tolar, the tolar.

[Delic] And so now that money, I don't know whether I should buy that manure or not...

[Milicevic] We will see in the morning. I will call that [expletive omitted], that Ajdukovic.

A little later:

[Delic] [Expletive omitted], I heard that Buna fell.

[Milicevic] Yes, yesterday.

[Delic] Does this have to do with some kind of retaliation now?

[Milicevic] No. Like the one yesterday, that they staged the attack on Banski Dvori.

[Delic] I know how they staged it, [expletive omitted].

[Milicevic] But they say that it is a retaliation. In any case, there was arson there.... In any case, in a few days it will all be settled.

[Delic] It will not, [expletive omitted].

[Milicevic] You will survive, we will, whatever happens.

[Delic] I do not know if I will survive. If those people...I will set fire to Maribor. In any case they have declared me a war criminal, and so I should be one.

[Milicevic] That is true. Hold on, Mico.

[Delic] I cannot do it anymore.

On 9 October:

[Milicevic] Let me tell you what is expected. Ten minutes ago Admiral Brovet said that they would negotiate with those representatives about the withdrawal from Slovenia, along the roads and so forth....

[Pavlov] What will we do here now? They are not accepting checks, they do not recognize them. I do not know what we will feed people with; we cannot provide anything.

[Milicevic] Wait a little, since you have three days. You probably have some real money, so buy a few coupons. You cannot give them orders; you have to adjust to them a little....

A conversation between General Pavlov and General Avramovic:

[Pavlov] Some soldier tried to desert. When he fled across the fence he ran into a mine. Just at that time his brother was visiting; besides, he is an Albanian. He said, "You killed our brother," and my commander told him, "You killed him, because you persuaded him to escape." That was in Pivka.

A little later the same day: "Last night a soldier died in Postojna. We could take advantage of it to withdraw from there. We will transport him by helicopter, because he is from Kosovo. Nedovic, Vujovic, and I could also leave. Stanko Nikolic and Zoran Prasevic would stay. The rest would go with the unit."

On 9 October, Delic in a conversation with General Raseta:

[Delic] Otherwise there is nothing special; they told me they would let Ratko go today.

[Raseta] Who?

[Delic] Katalina.

[Raseta] Good, because I wrote a protest to all the Slovene authorities.

[Delic] ...Even before that a warrant was issued for me, and now they have also distributed my picture to all the policemen. They have an assignment to capture me....

[Raseta] To capture you? They will catch you by the nose.

[Delic] No, they will not capture me.

[Raseta] When we do all this, Joso, a helicopter will come and take you out.

[Delic] They are getting bolder and bolder; they inspect every transport from the barracks, and we are also thinking about how they could be more insolent.

[Raseta] OK.

[Delic] If there are incidents, they will be responsible.

Then Generals Raseta and Delic also spoke a little about personal matters—about military automobiles, since Raseta was personally interested in them.

[Raseta] How much would a TAM 5000 cost?

[Delic] A hundred to 500, but it could also be less.

[Raseta] As long as it is really good, [expletive omitted].

[Delic] The only thing is that there aren't any more of the real TAM's, just our military ones, [expletive omitted].

[Raseta] Well, all right, [expletive omitted], let them be, since sometimes they are completely OK.

[Delic] OK.

[Raseta] Tonight I talked with a relative from Apatin. I will see if I can get it through Hungary.

[Delic] He should bring license plates, however; he will also have to repaint it here, and he should hurry with that.

A conversation between Metka from the military hospital and Gajo from Belgrade on 12 October:

[Metka] They are having a big sale here at the military hospital. Half of the hospital has already gone over the fence. Please hurry. We received two telegrams; one says that we should sell things, and the other one says we should not.

[Gajo] We don't know anything about that here; I will report it immediately. You inform Colonel Veljkovic, who is now at Brdo pri Kranju.

On the same day, a conversation between Raseta and Pavlov:

[Pavlov] Do you know what I did? Those flags, the old (?OPLE)—I gave them all to be distributed among the officers.

[Raseta] Give it to all the officers.

[Pavlov] I also gave a Celica (Toyota).

[Raseta] You understand me—give rice, sugar, macaroni, and oil to the officers.

[Pavlov] Should they pay for it?

[Raseta] As much as they can. To all the officers, the ones who were good. Make a list, and let them buy at minimal prices rice, sugar, flour, salt, [expletive omitted]. You will give it for free....

[Pavlov] It is better for us to give it to them than for them to take it from us.

[Raseta] [Expletive omitted] I should give it to them for free, and charge the officers, [expletive omitted].

[Pavlov] Comrade general, you just get out alive, and we'll get out too.

[Raseta] My life is not that cheap.

[Pavlov] I know it isn't, and that is why I am saying that we should get out alive, and the rest will work out somehow.

[Raseta] Everything will....

[Pavlov] I am also hoping and that is how I look at things, but there are individuals who are selling us very cheaply, [expletive omitted].

[Raseta] Let it go. Don't worry; you have a good apartment in Reka, buy it, and then anyone would be glad to buy it from you in Reka.

[Pavlov] It won't work—that decision, you know how they wrote it. As an official apartment.

[Raseta] Listen, I ask you...Tomorrow I will call that superintendent and tell him that Emin should report to me from there. In any case, do you have ski equipment there? Has it gone? Look, if there is any good ski equipment and so forth, sell it all to the officers. Don't worry about it.

[Pavlov] I understand, comrade general.

[Raseta] The people will gild all of it.

[Pavlov] Yes.

A conversation between General Pavlov and a good friend of his, a high-level officer from Belgrade, on 16 October:

[Officer] Listen, Jokic is here today. He will show you the agreements that say what to do with those things. In principle, it has to remain here.

[Pavlov] Well, it has to, it has to.

[Officer] It has to, [expletive omitted]! We are leaving the tanks there, and we are also thinking about TV's.

[Pavlov] There are no more TV's. I sent all of it to you by train that time. The TV's, video recorders, video cameras, paintings, and so forth. The Internal Affairs Ministry troops stole it all, however.

[Officer] [Expletive omitted]. Just one more thing! As soon as you get here and get settled a little, don't ever ask anyone anything, but come immediately to Belgrade and solve your problem. They will all be going crazy. In 10 days they will send you somewhere, just as they also sent Stojan.

[Pavlov] Where did Stojan go?

[Officer] Don't you know? Now he is in Patuljinske Livade, he has children in Maribor, and his wife is in Mladenovac. He doesn't even know if the children have money, if they have anything for food.

On 25 October at 8:00 [AM or PM not specified], a conversation between General Pavlov and General Sljivic:

[Pavlov] A little earlier I spoke with Erak and Simonic. I told them what I had done so far.

[Sljivic] Has that PO 91 already made one trip?

[Pavlov] Yes. It left last night and came back this morning at 0700. Now it is loading for another trip. It has loaded seven vehicles.

[Sljivic] PO 93 will come from Boka to Koper at 1700. It is similar to this one. We will see whether it will come directly down, or to Pula, to load more of the lighter things. The Sveti Stefan should be in Koper around 9 [AM or PM not specified], and the Venus should arrive around 10 or 11 [AM or PM not specified]. It would be best if the Sveti Stefan loaded as much as possible and all of the personnel, since it can take that many people. The Venus will collect all the rest and return to Pula....

[Pavlov] We will fill it. There will be another 100 vehicles left for it.

[Sljivic] You can load 40 vehicles on the Sveti Stefan. But be careful; you have to give notice. I received a letter from Bogataj this morning. It says that those ships have not been reported for the rest. There is that obligation there—six hours...Do you think that they could interview you there if they wanted some sort of statement from you?

[Pavlov] I will not say anything. What should I say, and to whom?

[Sljivic] I know, maybe it would be good, but if you gave an awkward statement, and let them publish what they want, since you know what they are like. It is an event for them. The last soldier has left Slovenia.

[Pavlov] Yes, yes.

[Sljivic] Think a little about what you will say. Say that you are happy that you are going, because you are leaving that kind of people. They will probably not lock you up for that. Call me from Koper if things work out. And write down my civilian telephone numbers—645-873, and 657-282.

Ineffectiveness of JNA Generals Discussed

*92BA0103A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
22 Oct 91 pp 22-23*

[Article by Ante Barisic, M.A.: "Who Will Dismiss the Generals"]

[Text] Very few people will remember the interview with Dr. Vladimir Bakaric which FRANKFURTER RUND-SCHAU published on 17 December 1971 and in which Bakaric issued the warning that the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] represented a certain potential danger and that its function was not to maintain internal order in the country, but to protect the Yugoslav borders from external enemies. The reason why we mention Bakaric's allegations is pedagogical in nature and is addressed to those who have missed, overlooked, or forgotten his key assertion: Every attempt of the JNA to take power in Yugoslavia would bring about civil war.

Ten years later, on 13 December 1981, General Jaruzelski temporarily put an end to the democratic mobilization of the Poles by a military coup d'etat and thereby seriously called into question the usual Marxist-Leninist premises concerning military-civilian relations, which are based on the maxim that "politics is always superior to the rifle."

The Polish Option

Overlooking or rejecting Bakaric's thoughts, and enthused by the shortsighted special case of the Polish military coup in 1981, generals who received their general's stars in the JNA took as their point of departure the assessment that domestic political events had become so serious that they could not be resolved by political processes, and that the crisis had thereby become so dangerous and escalated to such an extent that it threatened the survival of the state of Yugoslavia. Even in the mid-1980's, Western scholarly circles gave great weight to the Polish option in regulating military-civilian relations in Yugoslavia, with the proviso that the attempt of the JNA to take power in the country would be a much more problematical case than that faced by the Polish Army in 1981. The Polish Armed Forces, that is, had done the logistical planning for an overthrow methodically, in detail, and over a lengthy period of time, and they began the execution in complete secrecy at precisely the time when the Polish communist civilian authorities at the time had consented to the demand of Solidarnosc in August 1980.

Aside from the element of secrecy, the shrewd timing of the action, surprise, and the very well-coordinated move of arresting all possible persons who might have caused any trouble whatsoever over the entire territory of Poland, the Army relied to a considerable extent on the Security Service for a successful execution of the coup and on the well-paid, indoctrinated, trained, and equipped semimilitary police formations known as the ZOMO. The isolation and capture of all civilian communications systems in the country and radio and TV installations were a particular contribution to Jaruzelski's success.

With those experiences in mind, it was assumed that a successful military takeover could be carried out without major technical difficulties in Yugoslavia according to a resolute and firm scenario of the JNA if it were well planned in advance, kept in complete secrecy up to the moment of execution, well organized, and politically convincing. Once the military coup had been carried out, some political body representing the Army would be presented to the public, the Yugoslav Constitution dating from 1974 would be suspended, and the military regime of a state of war would be imposed with Draconian powers. Regardless of its domestic policy, that kind of military regime would count on Realpolitik as its means of gaining international recognition. That easier technical part of the job would be followed by numerous problems related to smothering every kind of resistance, creating a more lasting and effective political system that

would point toward achievement of at least a grain of legitimacy. In any case, Jaruzelski's subsequent failure and humiliating withdrawal from political life clearly demonstrated what insurmountable difficulties were involved.

A Historical Analogy

Obstinately proceeding on the moth-eaten thesis that nationalism as an ideology, separatism as a policy, and terrorism as a method of execution constitute the roots of the Yugoslav crisis, the generals of the JNA presumptuously wanted to "interdict" by its action the wave of mobilization of political forces that had welled up and grown over the entire space of Yugoslavia. In the Yugoslav case, the mobilization, in keeping with the European and worldwide trend of the triumph of democracy over the regime of real socialism and the military regime (South America in the 1980's), followed the road of ethnic self-determination as an urgent issue.

But the military action, first attempted as direct intervention in Slovenia, proved to be an absolute failure, and then it experienced complete collapse in the case of the war in Croatia and activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The Army which used nationalism, separatism, and terrorism as the grounds for its intervention on the territory of others, actually aligned itself with one nationalism—Serbian nationalism, with one separatistic policy—the Serbian policy, and it began to practice exclusively the terrorist method of waging war with personnel who are exclusively of Serbian nationality.

The international community has recognized that and has taken a clear position, first in the case of Slovenia, and then ultimately, painfully slowly and with great sacrifices, in the case of Croatia as well. The reaction of the international community to the military putsch in the Yugoslav Presidency and the Serb-Montenegrin usurpation of federal authority was considerably faster and more resolute. The case of Great Britain, a country that is traditionally well informed about relations in the Yugoslav region, is particularly paradigmatic in this regard. Just as on the eve of World War II, when Gen. Simovic of the Royal Air Force carried out the putsch on 27 March 1941, so in 1991 some of the Yugoslav generals mistakenly read the signals coming from the Anglo-Saxon world. Seeing that the royal government and its defense minister, the Chetnik Gen. Draza Mihajlovic, were collaborating with the fascist forces and did not represent the future of their country, British Prime Minister Churchill made a Copernican revolution and, renouncing the monarchy, began to support Josip Broz Tito. The most recent points of emphasis in British policy, a particularly important part of which is contained in the statements of Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd who describes the behavior of the JNA as criminal banditry, with the return of the heir of the Karadjordjevic royal family to Belgrade and Serbia, is like beginning to roll the film of history backward.

Confronted With Democracy

We can expect that some present-day Chetnik and Chetnik-like defense ministers and their local dukes by the force of historical analogy will find themselves if not in the defendant's box for war crimes, at least cast out of political life. The weaker intensity of the Army-Chetnik aggression on the Croatian fronts on the eve of the meeting of the eight presidents in The Hague and the termination of the "big war" by the change that has occurred within the JNA, which has signed its withdrawal from Croatia within a month, are certainly clear indicators that can be used in evaluating the fate which awaits the defeated generals.

The meeting of Gorbachev, Tudjman, and Milosevic in Moscow precisely confirms that the generals have been cast out or have cast themselves out of the political field without even having noticed it. Yazov, with whom Kadijevic secretly conferred in Moscow on 13 March of this year, is in prison at the moment after the failed military coup, and no one has even summoned Kadijevic to Moscow. Following the talk between Cyrus Vance, special emissary of the UN General Secretary, with Kadijevic and Adzic in Belgrade, and Kadijevic's subsequent responses concerning the deportation of Croats from Ilok and the attack of the military forces on Dubrovnik, it is only a matter of time before the military junta will no longer be summoned to any other capitals in which the actors in the Yugoslav political drama are seeking their lost soul. If any credit ever was due those generals, it dissolved in the face of their inability to rise above nationalistic ideology, separatist politics, and the terrorist method for which the Serbian political power center unsuccessfully coopted them.

Even though we have to be patient for some time yet, it seems that once again we have lived to see a confirmation of Cosic's lamentation that the Serbs lose in the peace what they have gained in the war. The failure of the military wing of Serbian politics to recycle its own miniimperialism in the case of Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina pushes into the foreground the political means and abilities of each of the actors to fight for his own objectives in the political field and with political weapons. This will not facilitate in the least the process of demilitarization of South Slav lands, but in the case of Croatia, unfortunately, it is displaying a merciless face such as has not been seen by any of the societies that have gone beyond real socialism.

Lost Souls

The opinion of certain planners that the process of demilitarization of Serbian politics and among the Serbs could be speeded up and controlled under the circumstances of a complete economic collapse has not been unambiguously determined. That is, it is very difficult to make a reliable judgment about the direct connection between the economic crisis and political change and the direction and timing of those changes. The case will rather be that we will soon see the final withdrawal of the Army from politics, and each of the established policies within the lands of Yugoslavia will have to face the fundamental issues of democracy and the challenges of mobilizations which will have a different basis than that of ethnic self-determination. It is possible to find the lost soul by an abrupt abandonment of paradigms from the last century (for example, the one about sentimental Slavism, which was supposed to give real strength to the truce agreed to in Moscow) and models of conflict from this century (territory taken by force and dictating the outcome of negotiations from those positions attained). Turning in upon ourselves is perceived as a general effort to make every sphere of life contemporary, modern, and "up-to-the-minute," which is predicated upon withdrawal of the Army from politics, i.e., viewed more broadly, upon demilitarization of society. The Croatian price of demilitarization, conceived as withdrawal from its territory of the Army that has been the aggressor and occupier and achievement of the fullness of our own independence and statehood, is a terrible one, but it is also the starting line and border line of any Croatian position in political negotiations. Any prepolitical and prehistorical attempt, we might say, to do a small trade in these historic times, which are critical for Croatia, in matters having to do with the political fate of the generals, any attempt to exploit them indecently in the media in a sensationalist way and in endemic proportions would be directly harmful to the Croatian political interest because it would anesthetize the consumers or put them in a psychotic state. By harboring a picture that is unrealistic concerning the side from which threatens a real or imagined danger, we subsequently place ourselves in the danger of dealing in the normal and anticipated political competition with actors who are unable to participate independently and democratically. Satanization, seeking out traitors and an actual "witch hunt" cannot take the place of a responsible, mature, and authentic policy which will win over the international community and its members to accept it, respect it, and recognize it because of the evidence it gives of itself. The level of rationalization and of the arrangement of military-civilian relations in any community are one of the crucial indicators in evaluation of specific policies.

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